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The sunk cost effect, known as the degree to which an initial investment of time, effort, 
or money increases the likelihood of continued investment, and delay discounting, defined as 
how rapidly the subjective value of a reward declines as a function of the delay to its receipt, 
incorporate the role of temporally distant stimuli, but have not been evaluated simultaneously. 
One process that may link the two phenomena is the temporal attention hypothesis, which holds 
that the degree to which one perceives distant events as close to the present, and one’s ability to 
shift their temporal focus from now to not now, jointly contributes to the mechanism of delay 
discounting. The first of the two experiments showed that participants with higher subjective 
time perception (i.e., perceived distant objective time points as subjectively closer to the present) 
committed more sunk cost across hypothetical temporal gaps between the initial and terminal 
links, and exhibited lower rates of delay discounting than those with lower subjective time 
perception.  In Experiment 2, the same sunk cost procedure was used, except that four temporal 
gap conditions were used that matched the time points used in the delay discounting task. 
Further, participants experienced either negative, neutral, or positively valenced income 
narratives, which have previously been shown to alter rates of delay discounting. Additionally, 
probed time points in the future and past subjective time perception tasks more closely matched 
those used in the delay discounting and sunk cost tasks, and both future and past subjective time 
perception were derived used Mazur’s (1987) hyperbolic model. A series of Quade non-
parametric ANCOVAs failed to reveal a significant effect of income narrative on delay 
discounting, any measure of sunk cost, future or past subjective time perception, and past, 
present, and future temporal focus. Extra sum of squares tests revealed, however, that 
hyperboloid models of mean sunk cost and median indifference data across the three groups were 
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better fit to separate curves than one curve. Hyperbolic decline in subjective time perception (Ln 
(k)) for future and past subjective time perception were strongly correlated and were combined 
together to form the measure joint time perception, which correlated with delay discounting, but 
did not correlate with any measure of sunk cost. Future subjective time perception was divided 
by past subjective time perception to form the measure of time perception index, which was only 
correlated with sunk cost measures, but not delay discounting. Overall sunk cost (i.e., terminal 
investment percentage of $5 initial investments subtracted by $35 initial investments) was 
directly correlated with delay discounting such that greater amounts of sunk cost related to lower 
rates of delay discounting, providing added evidence that the sunk cost effect may relate to lower 
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Temporal Attention, the Sunk Cost Effect, and Delay Discounting Introduction 
Behavioral economics has been defined as the systematic evaluation of responding under 
constraints (Bickel, Green, & Vuchinich, 1995). A particularly popular domain of behavioral 
economics is concerned with patterns of choice and the potentially maladaptive (or adaptive) 
contexts under which such behavior occurs (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Koffarnus, & 
Gatchalian, 2012). Increasingly, behavioral economic insights have been used to understand the 
etiology of clinical problems (Bickel et al., 2013; Bickel, Madden, & Petry, 1998). Further, 
behavioral economic researchers, including behavior analysts, do not use normative 
conceptualizations of “rational” behavior, and instead focus on the functional processes by which 
behavior occurs. Broadly, much of behavioral economics is conceptualized as a ratio of costs 
over benefits. In the context of decision-making, time either is typically used as a variable 
constraining the utility of the benefit (Jarmolowicz & Hudnall, 2014), or as a cost factor (Killeen, 
2009). In either case, however, time is often experimentally pitted against some dimension of 
reward. When given a systematic series of choices between smaller sooner and larger later 
rewards, for example, preferences for more proximal and larger rewards are pitted against each 
other (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). Interestingly, although current behavior is perpetually at 
the locus of past and future events, there is comparatively little research evaluating how past 
versus future events might function similarly within decision-making contexts. (cf. Radu, Yi, 
Bickel, Gross, & McClure, 2011; Yi, Gatchalian, & Bickel, 2006).  
Delay Discounting  
Delay discounting can be described as the degree to which the current subjective value of 
a reward declines as a function of the delay to its receipt (Green & Myerson, 2004). Delay 
discounting tasks typically pit smaller yet more immediate amounts of money against larger yet 
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more delayed amounts by titrating reward amount (Rachlin et al., 1991; Richards, Mitchell, de 
Wit, & Seiden, 1997), or delay (Koffarnus & Bickel, 2014), while holding the other variable 
constant. Indifference points (i.e. the point at which the subjective value between the smaller 
sooner and larger later rewards are roughly equivalent), are determined for each of the 
parametric values of the adjusting variable (e.g., delay or amount). A discount function is often 
expressed visually, wherein each of the indifference points are plotted as a function of the 
nominal delays. Delay discounting is commonly quantified and expressed using hyperbolic 




 ,      (1) 
where V corresponds to the subjective value of some amount (A) of a commodity, which 
decreases as a function of the delay (d) to receiving the commodity. The rate at which this 
subjective value decreases is quantified by the only fitted parameter, k. A hyperbolic-like 
variation of this function, derived from Rachlin (2006), is a hyperboloid model that adds an 




      (2) 
In addition to describing discounting data, the hyperbolic and hyperboloid functions 
account for seemingly inconsistent choices (i.e., preference reversals across time). A college 
student may initially indicate a preference to stay in to study for an exam early in a given day 
(presumably the larger later reward); only to reverse preference by attending an evening party 
(presumably the smaller sooner reward) as the time to the celebration becomes increasingly 
proximal. Importantly, normative economic models of discounting choice typically use an 
exponential function to represent the discount rate (Monterosso & Ainslie, 2007), which usually 
predict that one’s reward preference will remain constant across time. Unlike exponential 
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functions, hyperbolic discount functions are thought to better predict seemingly irrational 
changes in preference (Kirby, 1997; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). An exponential discounting 
function, as depicted in panel A of Figure 1, corresponds to an initial preference for the larger 
later reward at T0 that will maintain until the receipt of the larger later reward at T2. By contrast, 
a hyperbolic discounting function, as shown in panel B of Figure 1, shows that an initial 
preference for the larger later reward reverses prior to T2. Therefore, the smaller sooner reward 
would be selected if the choice is made at T1 (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992). Higher relative rates of 
hyperbolic delay discounting have been shown to correspond to more preference reversals (Yi, 
Matusiewicz, & Tyson, 2016), and are often theoretically linked by the hyperbolic model  
(Equation 1; Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Rachlin & Raineri, 1992). In addition, higher relative rates 
of discounting are linked to a greater propensity to exhibit problems such as substance abuse 
(Bickel, Koffarnus, Moody, & Wilson, 2014; Kirby & Petry, 2004) obesity (Bickel, Wilson, et 
al., 2014; Epstein, Salvy, Carr, Dearing, & Bickel, 2010) and ADHD (Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, 
Fletcher, & Metevia, 2001; Wilson, Mitchell, Musser, Schmitt, & Nigg, 2011). Further, delay 
discounting procedures provide a seemingly straightforward assessment of maladaptive (higher 
relative rates of discounting) to adaptive (lower relative rates of discounting) decision-making. 
Unfortunately, little is known regarding how cost and reward variables associated with 
temporally distant past events might relate to future delay discounting (Bickel, Wilson, Chen, 
Koffarnus, & Franck, 2016b). 
Past delay discounting.One approach to better understanding valuation of past events is 
delay discounting of past rewards (Bickel et al., 2016b; Radu et al., 2011; Yi et al., 2006). In 
such tasks, participants indicate their preference for smaller monetary rewards recently received, 
or larger but more temporally distant rewards. Delay discounting of past rewards tend to be 
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symmetrically related to delay discounting of future rewards (Radu et al., 2011). The study of 
delay discounting of past events may be useful for two primary reasons. First, past and future 
delay discounting may bi-directionally influence one another (Yi et al., 2006), thereby providing 
two unique but related treatment targets. Second, although past and future delay discounting are 
positively correlated, there are individual differences in the degree to which future and past 
discounting overlap, which suggests that another temporal factor (e.g., time perception) may 
influence the relation between future and past discounting (Radu et al., 2011). Exploring past 
delay discounting may therefore provide an empirical and conceptual framework conducive to 
investigating how other variables might affect delay discounting. 
Despite this, discounting of past rewards comes with two notable limitations. First, it is 
always in the organism’s best interest to choose the more temporally distant but larger reward 
because the larger and more temporally distant option provides both a large amount of money 
and an added opportunity to gain interest. Second, delay discounting of past rewards and delay 
discounting of future rewards are typically provided on a within-subject basis such that all 
participants complete both procedures. It is possible that the observed symmetrical patterns of 
discounting are merely an artifact of procedural similarities between the two tasks. In other 
words, regardless of counterbalancing the order of past and future discounting tasks, experience 
completing one of the tasks may increase the likelihood of similar responding on the other. 
Although delay discounting of past rewards has provided interesting findings, addressing the 
above limitations through alternative methods may create a context to investigate how cost and 






The temporal attention hypothesis posits that decision-making patterns during both past 
and future delay discounting assessments may not necessarily reflect an inability to delay 
gratification, but the degree to which an individual’s behavior is impacted by temporally distant 
events (Radu et al., 2011). In a series of studies investigating the manipulation of time to both 
past and future events, Radu and colleagues (2011) evaluated how providing information both on 
what you would receive and not receive for the immediate and delayed options affected rates of 
past and future delay discounting (i.e., the hidden zero affect). The hidden zero effect (Magen, 
Dweck, & Gross, 2008a) is a product of procedures wherein participants are presented with what 
they would and would not receive for both the immediate and delay options (e.g., ‘‘$50.00 today 
and $0 in 14 days, vs. $0 today and $100 in 30 days’’). According to the temporal attention 
hypothesis, hidden zero manipulations may reduce delay discounting rates by mitigating the 
attractiveness of the immediate option. Specifically, the unpleasant consequence of choosing the 
immediate option (i.e., $0 will be received for the delayed outcome) is made more salient, thus 
that reducing the appeal of the immediate reward by placing it in the same temporal frame as the 
unpleasant and distant long term consequence (Radu et al., 2011). 
In Experiment 2 of Radu et al. (2011), delay discounting was assessed with and without 
hidden zero manipulations for both past and future outcomes for each participant. Hidden zero 
manipulation resulted in greater preference for the temporally distant option for both past and 
future discounting procedures. Further, the degree of change between the hidden zero and non-
hidden zero versions for past and future discounting were significantly correlated. In Experiment 
4 of Radu et al. (2011), participants were either instructed to estimate how long ago they 
experienced each of seven common events (temporal priming group), or estimated caloric 
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content of seven common food items (control group). Those in the temporal priming group 
discounted past rewards at lower rates than those in the control group. The authors postulated 
that valuation of past events may affect delay discounting of future rewards, prompting 
subsequent interest in the joint implications of past and future discounting within clinical 
contexts. As mentioned previously, choosing the more temporally distant reward is always the 
more functional choice within past delay discounting paradigms. Further, observed symmetrical 
effects observed between past and future discounting may be an artifact of procedural 
similarities. These potential limitations incentivize the development of new methods of 
investigating the impact of temporally distant rewards on current behavior. 
The Sunk Cost Effect 
Examining the extent to which subjects commit the sunk cost effect, defined as allowing 
an initial investment of time, effort, or money to increase the likelihood of their continued 
investment (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Staw, 1976), may be an ideal 
alternative approach to evaluating the impact of temporally distant past stimuli on current 
behavior. Typically, the sunk cost is discussed as a subcategory of escalation, or the tendency to 
continue to invest resources despite negative consequences (Sofis, Jarmolowicz, Hudnall, & 
Reed, 2015; Staw, 1976, 1997). Interestingly, the oft-cited definition of escalation from Staw 
(1976) was not intended as an argument that escalation is exclusively irrational or maladaptive 
(Staw & Ross, 1989). Instead, escalation was conceptualized as unexpected persistence that 
appears insensitive to particular costs or rewards (Staw, 1976, 1997; Staw & Ross, 1989). 
Pioneering researchers on the sunk cost effect were less concerned with the adaptive or rational 
nature of the sunk cost effect or escalation than the psychological determinants of the phenomena 
(Staw & Ross, 1989). Instances of escalation, however, do not necessarily exemplify the sunk 
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cost effect. For example, someone who is more likely to persistent in overeating in a given sitting 
may persist as a function of specific characteristics of the reinforcer (i.e. escalation only), or 
because of stimulus control exerted by a previous investment (i.e., sunk cost; which is escalation 
under the stimulus control of an initial investment). Although seemingly semantic in nature, the 
sunk cost and escalation likely involve unique processes underlying the overeating tendency, and 
thus may demonstrate notable translational utility. 
Sunk cost vs. escalation.Unfortunately, operant researchers often use the terms 
escalation and sunk cost interchangeably (Macaskill & Hackenberg, 2012; Navarro & Fantino, 
2005; White & Magalhaes, 2015), without demonstrating that characteristics of initial bouts of 
responding (i.e. initial investment) differentially relate to continued investment (Macaskill & 
Hackenberg, 2012; Navarro & Fantino, 2005). In a study by Navarro and Fantino (2005), for 
example, pigeons earned reinforcement on one key for pecks on one of four, fixed ratio (FR) 
values (10, 40, 80, and 160) presented on 50%, 25%, 12.5%, and 12.5% of trials, respectively. 
On a separate key, pigeons could escape each trial at any point following the first 10 responses 
on the FR key. This escape option was signaled in one condition but unsignaled in another. The 
sunk cost effect was conceptualized as completing any of the FRs above an FR10, because an 
escape response was most likely to result in an FR10 (i.e., 50%)  on the following trial, thereby 
making the expected value of escaping normatively greater than persisting. There are several 
potential issues, however, with this conceptualization of the sunk cost effect. First, it is unlikely 
that responses before and after the 10th response were discriminable, as was suggested by 
findings that the pigeons persisted through nearly 100% of all FR trials during the unsignaled 
condition and 0% in the signaled condition. These data suggest that FR responding likely 
occurred in functional units that were void of discrete initial and terminal investment runs. 
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Therefore, it is difficult to provide empirical support that initial investment amounts were 
differentially related to continued investment. 
By contrast to many operant researchers, the predominate approach to evaluating sunk 
costs entails assigning independent groups to different initial investment conditions and identical 
terminal investment conditions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976).  In a 
famous study by Arkes and Blumer (1985), for example, individuals who purchased season 
tickets to the university theatre were randomly assigned to either pay $5, $10, or $15 (i.e., the 
initial link) for access to all shows for the upcoming academic year. Attendance was calculated 
for the first and second semesters and the more money participants paid for the theatre tickets 
initially, the more frequently they attended during the first semester of shows (i.e., the sunk cost 
effect). 
In a study by Sofis et al. (2015), however, the sunk cost effect and escalation were 
empirically differentiated. Specifically, participants made forced choice initial investments ($5, 
$20, or $35, randomized) prior to choosing whether to complete or pass on projects in a terminal 
link ($5, $20, $50, $80, or $95, randomized). In this paradigm, completing any $80 or $95 
investment was considered an instance of escalation, as either cost is greater than escaping to 
experience the average cost of a new trial (i.e., $70). The sunk cost effect was defined as passing 
on a specific escalation amount (i.e., completing an $80 or $95 terminal investment) when the 
initial investment was $5, and completing that same escalation amount on a separate trial when 
the initial investment was $35. Similar to the findings reported by Arkes & Blumer (1985), there 
was a systematic effect of initial investment amount and proportion of choices made to complete 
the $95 terminal investment. Notably, 54% of participants exhibited the sunk cost effect, while 
87% engaged in at least one instance of escalation. In other words, there were participants who 
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engaged in only escalation, only the sunk cost effect, and both, providing clear evidence that the 
sunk cost effect may be a related, but independent phenomenon of escalation. 
The sunk cost as temporal decision-making paradigm.Similar to delay discounting, 
the sunk cost effect provides a context for evaluating how time between a temporally distant 
event and the present affects current decisions. Unlike delay discounting, wherein decisions are 
all made at a single choice point, the sunk cost effect is often explored using a sequential 
paradigm with two links (i.e., initial investment [forced choice] & terminal investment [free 
choice]), removed from each other in time. From a normative perspective, only prospective value 
(i.e., potential future reward), not previous costs, should affect current decision making (Staw, 
1976). Interestingly, the potential adaptability of the sunk cost from a psychological, not 
economic, perspective has engendered significant debate, in part, because there is limited 
empirical evidence in support of either viewpoint (Siniver & Yaniv, 2012). Some have argued 
that an underlying propensity to exhibit the sunk cost effect can function as a form of self-control 
and facilitate persistence necessary to obtain larger later rewards (Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 
2002; Rachlin, 2000). Large down payments for gym memberships, for example, might result in 
increased gym attendance and have been discussed as commitment responses (Rachlin, 2000; 
Rachlin & Green, 1972). Interestingly, Coleman (2010a) found that even small differences in 
monetary initial investments for college courses increased the likelihood of self-reported time 
participants would dedicate to continuing their education.  
Normative accounts hold that the sunk cost effect violates the economic principle that 
investments of time, effort, and money should only be made when future benefit exceeds future 
costs (Staw & Ross, 1989). Such normative theories on the maladaptive nature of the sunk cost 
effect often come from the organizational decision-making literature, wherein decision-makers 
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continue to invest resources due to past investment and fail to consider current and future 
circumstances (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976, 1997; Staw & Ross, 1989). As noted by Rachlin 
(2000) and Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino (2002), however, a propensity to continue investments 
after an initial effort may be fundamental to persisting in behaviors that have resulted in larger 
yet delayed rewards in the past [e.g., persisting in completing educational goals (Coleman, 
2010b)]. Past investments in gym memberships or yearlong subscription services, for example, 
hold considerable prospective value by providing less-constrained access to rewarding services 
or commodities following the initial investment. An ability to recognize the potentially 
controlling influence of such an initial investment on prospective value has been discussed as an 
important form of self-control (Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2002; Rachlin, 2000). A conservative 
approach, and one in line with the broader behavioral economic and behavior analytic literatures, 
would be to hold that the sunk cost effect is contextually dependent. Specifically, it may be 
adaptive to exhibit in some instances and maladaptive in others (Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 
2002; Rachlin, 2000; Zeelenberg, 1999). 
Understanding if, and under what conditions the sunk cost effect relates to delay 
discounting, however, may facilitate an increased understanding of the temporal characteristics 
underlying adaptive and maladaptive decision-making (e.g., self-control vs impulsivity). 
Scholars have hypothesized, for example, that exhibiting the sunk cost as a may be adaptive in 
the context of commitment towards larger deferred rewards (Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2002; 
Rachlin, 2000; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Seigel & Rachlin, 1995). One method of testing this 
assertion is to test whether a greater propensity to exhibit the sunk cost effect relates to lower 
rates of discounting. Relatedly, if the sunk cost effect is as well-explained by temporal attention 
as is delay discounting (Radu et al., 2011), then one would expect lower rates of discounting to 
 
11 
correspond to greater levels of the sunk cost effect.  Further, the hypothesized process by which 
the hidden-zero affect alters delay discounting is by putting the smaller sooner and larger later 
rewards in the same temporal frame (Radu et al., 2011). Specifically, the hidden zero effect 
could influence discounting through altering subjective perceptions of time, making distant 
events appear more proximal than before, thus enhancing relative preference for larger later past 
and future rewards. Therefore, a key process that could underlie temporal attention, delay 
discounting, and the sunk cost effect is subjective time perception (Radu et al., 2011). 
Time Perception 
Time perception can broadly be described as the perception of the periodicity between 
presentations of stimuli and responses compared to the actual periodicity between the same 
events (Allman & Meck, 2012; Gibbon, 1977) (See Table 1 for a review of time perception 
constructs). More simply, time perception has been described as the perceived duration between 
time points as a function of the objective time passed i.e., clock time; Kim and Zauberman 
(2009). Time perception, however, is often confused with temporal perspective or time horizon, 
which often refer to measures derived from personality scales (Strathamn, Gleicher, Boninger, & 
Edwards, 1994; Zimbardo, 1992). Measures of time perspective are typically thought to measure 
stable individual differences in relative consideration of past, present, and future personality or 
trait characteristics (Keough, Zimbardo, & Boyd, 1999; Strathamn et al., 1994). Unfortunately, 
such measures of time perspective often include additional assumptions about the adaptive or 
maladaptive nature of future or past-oriented thinking and evaluate a multitude of non-time-
oriented constructs. The Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI), for example, asks 
questions related to the “past” that suggest that temporal attention directed towards the past can 
only be maladaptive (e.g., “I think about bad things that have happened to me in the past”). 
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Although used frequently in conjunction with delay discounting, a systematic review by 
Teuscher and Mitchell (2011) revealed inconsistent, weak, and difficult to replicate correlations 
between rates of delay discounting and measures of time perspective. The mixed findings 
between time perspective and delay discounting and the confounding role of non-temporal 
constructs prompts exploration of alterative temporal measures. 
As shown in Figure 2, time perception can be separated into the categories of subjective 
time perception (i.e., past and future in the context of intervals ranging from days to years) and 
time estimation (i.e. past and future in the context of time intervals ranging from seconds to 
hours). Time estimation procedures typically entail asking participants to estimate durations of 
particular time intervals (Wittmann et al., 2011). Task instructions usually urge participants to 
provide their best possible estimate of the objective time that has passed. Time estimation 
procedures are generally categorized as either prospective time estimation, wherein participants 
are told in advance that they will be estimating duration, or retrospective time estimation, 
wherein participants are asked to estimate duration after experiencing an experimental task 
(Wearden, 2008). There is some evidence that those who overestimate how much time has 
passed in time estimation procedures tend to exhibit higher rates of delay discounting than those 
who do not overestimate how much time has passed (Baumann & Odum, 2012; Wittmann & 
Paulus, 2008). Baumann and Odum (2012), for example, used a temporal bisection procedure 
wherein participants were asked to judge the duration of a presence of circles as long or short. 
After training participants on the duration of short trials (i.e., circle presented for 2s) and long 
trials (i.e., circle presented for 4s), participants had to categorize a series of durations between 2-
4s as either short or long. The authors found that those with higher mean proportions of long 
responses as a function of the same stimuli (i.e., those who overestimate the duration of the 
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intervals) showed higher rates of discounting. In other words, the amount of time passed may 
seem subjectively longer in those who discount at higher rates. Further evidence of this came 
from Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004), who found that overestimation of time intervals from 
sleep deprivation corresponded with higher rates of discounting. The authors hypothesized the 
sleep-deprived participants may have subjectively perceived the delay intervals to be longer than 
those who were not sleep deprived. Despite these findings, there are multiple limitations of the 
literature synthesizing discounting and time estimation. 
Unfortunately, time estimation measures often inconsistently or weakly relate to delay 
discounting (Teuscher & Mitchell, 2011) In a study by Berry, Sweeney, Morath, Odum, and 
Jordan (2014), for example, a temporal bisection task was unrelated to delay discounting despite 
significant relations between multiple other temporal measures. One explanation for the lack of 
consistent relation is that mechanisms underlying time estimation fundamentally differ at time 
scales using seconds compared to those using months (Wittmann & Paulus, 2009). Another 
explanation is that time estimation between even sub and suprasecond time-scales may involve 
unique behavioral and neurological mechanisms (Buonomano, Bramen, & Khodadadifar, 2009; 
Wittmann & Paulus, 2009). Further disproportionate changes in discount rates shortly before and 
after 1 year delays may also be a product of unique time scales (Wittmann & Paulus, 2009). 
Another limitation to the literature attempting to connect delay discounting to time limitation is 
the logistical difficulties involved with measuring time estimation at time intervals greater than a 
one-session experimental session. Further, even if one had participants estimate time that had 
passed over times greater than 1 or 2 hours, use of clocks, calendars and other temporal cues 
would provide significant barriers. The degree to which delay discounting and time estimation 
relate remains unknown because of the dearth of research evaluating both phenomena at longer 
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intervals, potential fundamental difference in time estimation at parametrically removed time 
scales, and the inconsistent or weak findings between the two measures. 
Time perception and temporal attention.Subjective time perception tasks probe one’s 
subjective judgement of the passage of time as it relates to longer time intervals into the past or 
the future (e.g., minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, and years; Lejeune, Richelle, & Wearden, 
2006). In contrast to time estimation, time perception is usually measured by explicitly asking 
participants to provide their subjective interpretation or perception of durations of time (Kim & 
Zauberman, 2009). Although used less frequently than time perspective and time estimation 
measures, subjective time perception tends to consistently relate to delay discounting (Kim & 
Zauberman, 2009, 2013; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). Relatedly, orienting 
attention to the duration between present and temporally distant events, or towards one’s 
perception of the passage of time between events, decreases rates of delay discounting (Radu et 
al., 2011; Zauberman et al., 2009). Zauberman et al. (2009), for example, found that those 
participants who estimated how long it would take to complete certain activities discounted at 
lower rates than those who guessed the caloric content of certain foods. Zauberman et al. (2009) 
asked participants to imagine a day x time from now, and then indicate how long the given 
duration on a 180 mm line with “very short” on the left end and “very long” on the right end. 
The authors found that the greater the difference observed between perceptions of short time 
durations relative to long time durations (i.e., sensitivity), the lower the rate of delay discounting. 
Further, subjective time perception measures appear to covary consistently with changes in delay 
discounting (Kim & Zauberman, 2013; Zauberman et al., 2009). In a study by Kim & 
Zauberman (2013), for example, sexual cues lengthened the same measure of future time 
perception, which corresponded with increased rates of delay discounting. Such findings are 
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further supported by evidence that chronic smokers report the time until smoking is permitted to 
be longer when they are craving than when they are not (Sayette, Loewenstein, Kirchner, & 
Travis, 2005) and discounting rates are lowered when made in shorter temporal windows 
compared to longer ones.  
Although there are no studies to my knowledge evaluating both subjective past time 
perception and delay discounting, there is considerable evidence suggesting that subjective time 
perception of past and future events are related and are facilitated by overlapping neural systems 
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Nyberg, Kim, Habib, Levine, & 
Tulving, 2010; Okuda et al., 2003). Importantly, however, researchers arguing for the role of 
temporal attention have posited that two unique but related temporal constructs are prerequisites 
for temporal attention to occur. The first of these is subjective time perception, which is highly 
related to one’s temporal window. In other words, the degree to which one perceives objective 
temporal markers (e.g., exactly two months in the future from now) as subjectively close to the 
present, the more expansive their temporal window. The second of these temporal constructs is 
one’s temporal focus, which is hypothesized to relate to one’s temporal window and time 
perception of distant events. In Radu et al. (2011), for example, the authors posited that they may 
have observed individual differences in participant’s ability to draw attentional resources 
towards distant past versus distant future events. In other words, the perception that temporally 
distant events are close to the present may be a necessary prerequisite for attributing attentional 
resources to future events, thereby valuing them (Bickel et al., 2016b). One measure that might 
perform such a role is the Temporal Focus Scale (Shipp, Edwards, & Schurer Lambert, 2009).  
The Temporal Focus Scale is 12-item psychometric scale designed to measure one’s relative 
attention allocated towards future, past, and current events (Shipp et al., 2009). The well 
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validated scale (Shipp et al., 2009) has 12 items (four past, four present, four future) rated on a 7-
point scale (1= never; 3 = sometimes; 5 = frequently; 7 = constantly). The scale provides two 
notable advantages to other temporal scales measuring trait-like perceptions of time. First, none 
of the items present any assumed maladaptive or adaptive characteristics and none of the 
temporal directions (i.e., past, present, future) were assumed apriori to be adaptive or 
maladaptive. Second, Shipp et al. (2009) designed the scale with the assumption that attention is 
dynamic. Namely, attention can shift between time periods and that a propensity to focus on the 
future does not preclude a heightened focus on the past or present. Although there are no studies 
to my knowledge incorporating the temporal focus scale and delay discounting, future research 
on temporal attention may benefit from its inclusion.  
Integrating the Sunk Cost Effect, Delay Discounting, and Temporal Attention 
The sunk cost effect may be an ideal candidate for studying how temporally distant past 
events impact current behavior. First, like delay discounting, sunk cost procedures present 
intertemporal decisions juxtaposing present events with temporally distant ones, therefore 
providing strong potential for conceptual overlap. In delay discounting tasks, either reward 
amounts or delays are titrated across choice trials depending on participant choices between 
smaller sooner and larger later rewards (Rachlin et al., 1991; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de 
Wit, 1999). The point at which participants are indifferent between reward amounts are plotted 
for each delay condition, providing the data for the discounting curve. Similarly, the sunk cost 
effect is typically studied by manipulating a characteristic of the initial link investment (e.g., 
temporal gap between initial and terminal link) across experimental groups to observe the 
differential effects on terminal link behavior (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Therefore, both delay 
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discounting and sunk cost paradigms entail choices that are hypothetically separated, but related, 
in time.  
Second, the sunk cost effect may be an approach to understanding commitment responses 
that are made in anticipation of potential preference reversals (Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 
2007). Purchasing a year-long gym membership, for example, has been hypothesized to help in 
persisting towards long-term health goals such as persisting in an exercise regimen (Rachlin, 
2000). Further, Radu et al. (2011) temporally primed past positive experiences in Experiment 4 
and the authors suggested that increased salience of positive past experiences may increase 
future valuation (i.e., exemplified lower rates of future delay discounting). 
Relatedly, in a series of delay of gratification tasks that acknowledge that the anticipated 
timing of future rewards are often uncertain, McGuire & Kable (2012, 2013) found that 
participant predictions of the delay length remaining until the larger later reward increased as a 
function of already elapsed time. Specifically, in a study with human participants by McGuire 
and Kable (2012), randomly timed deliveries of delayed rewards were given according to either a 
uniform or a rapidly declining probability distribution of waiting time. Participants could opt out 
at any point to obtain a smaller sooner reward. The reward maximizing strategies across the two 
groups were to always persist, and to persist for roughly two seconds, respectively. Based on 
their respective experiences across repeated trials, those participants assigned to the uniform 
distribution condition adjusted their tolerance to wait (i.e., persisted) better than those with 
rapidly declining delivery schedules. Specifically, those in the rapidly declining group frequently 
passed on trials too soon. The authors concluded that high or low levels of persistence are not 
necessarily adaptive or maladaptive, but that adaptive persistence is exemplified by fluctuations 
that are sensitive to the environment. These findings suggest two important implications for 
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temporal attention as it relates to the sunk cost effect and delay discounting. First, individual 
differences in joint past and future time perception are shaped by ones history of reinforcement 
(McGuire & Kable, 2012, 2013). Second, bidirectionally linked subjective time perception may 
influence both the sunk cost effect (i.e., persistence under the stimulus control of an initial 
investment) and delay discounting at a longitudinal and moment-to-moment basis. In other 
words, one’s general propensity to exhibit expansive (or restrictive) time perception may be 
related to, but unique from, time perception at a state-level. A first step may therefore be to better 
understand how a subjective time perception measure, used as a proxy for temporal attention 
processes, relates to the sunk cost effect and delay discounting.  
Pilot evidence of the sunk cost and delay discounting overlap.Further evidence for the 
potential overlap between the sunk cost and delay discounting comes from a recent pilot study by 
Sofis, Lemley, & Jarmolowicz (under revision). Participants completed an adjusting amount 
delay discounting procedure (Richards et al., 1999), a novel temporal sunk cost task, and a 
subjective time perception task (Zauberman et al., 2009). A total of 55 subjects’ data were 
retained from an initial sample of 83 participants. Specifically, based on recommendations from 
Johnson and Bickel (2008), 22 participants were excluded for inconsistent indifference points 
across delays. An additional six participants were excluded for reporting one or more 
inconsistencies in time perception (e.g., reported that 12 months was closer to the present than 3 
months). One participant was excluded for always investing in all trials of the sunk cost task. 
Therefore, the final sample was 55 subjects.  
Subjective time perception was measured by instructing participants to, “Slide the tab to 
show how soon or far away x is from now” on a computer screen (x = 3 months, 1 year, and 3 
years). A visual analogue scale with a sliding tab was located below the instructions and had 
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labels of “really soon” (far left) “really far” (far right). After sliding the tab to indicate how 
subjectively close or far the objective time was from the present, participants clicked on a large 
button at the bottom of the screen that was labeled “Accept” to move to the next task. A single 
measure of subjective time perception was calculated for each participant by deriving k values 
using the hyperbolic model often used to model delay discounting (Mazur, 1987). The natural 
log of the k values was then calculated, which altered the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test from 0.30 (p 
< .01) to 0.07 (p > .20). Further, high and low time perception groups were created by 
performing a median split based on subjective time perception (Ln (k)). 
For the temporal sunk cost task, the authors replicated the procedures used in Sofis et al. 
(2015) by using $5 and $35 forced choice initial link investments and $5, $20, $80, and $95 free-
choice terminal link investments (with option to pass a begin a new trial). Besides not using $20 
as one of the initial link amounts, the only addition to the methods was the addition of 
hypothetical temporal gaps between initial and terminal links. Specifically, participants were 
exposed to conditions with a range of hypothetical temporal gaps (i.e., 0, 3, 12, or 36 months) 
between initial and terminal links. Within each temporal condition, for example, participants 
were told to imagine that they had made the initial investment 0, 3, 12, or 36 months ago and 
were presented with one of the two initial link monetary amounts. After clicking invest (forced-
choice), they were then provided with one of the four terminal link investments amounts on the 
left-hand side of the screen and a pass on the bottom-right-hand side.  
Within each series of eight trials (i.e., two initial link amounts and four terminal link 
amounts), referred to as a round, there were three important dependent measures. First, any 
completed terminal investment of $80 or $95 was counted as an escalation instance, because 
both $80 and $95 are greater than the average initial and terminal link amounts for a given trial 
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(i.e., $70). Specifically, the mean of $5 and $35 (initial links) is $20 and the mean of $5, $20, 
$80, and $95 is $50 (i.e., $20 + $50 = $70). Second, a sunk cost instance was a joint event 
wherein participants passed on a low initial-escalation trial (i.e., 5-80 or 5-95), and completed a 
high initial-escalation trial with the same escalation amount [(i.e. 35-80 or 35-95, respectively) 
(See Figure 3 for a demonstration of a sunk cost instance across two trials with $80 as the 
terminal investment option in both trials)]. Lastly, sunk cost proportion was an index measure 
calculated by taking the number of sunk cost instances plus one, divided by the number of sunk 
cost and escalation instances plus one. The natural log of each sunk cost proportion measure at 
each time point was calculated to improve the distributions of data and to allow for the data to be 
plotted symmetrically to the discounting data. 1 
Figure 4 shows mean Ln (sunk cost proportion (left y-axis)) and mean indifference points 
(right y-axis) as a function of days since initial investment (left panel x-axis) and days from now 
(right panel x-axis), whether individuals were in the high (open circles) or low (closed circles) 
subjective time perception groups. Curves were fit to group discounting data using Rachlin’s 
(2006) hyperboloid discounting model (see Equation 2), with the s parameter shared across 
groups of high and low time perception. The area under the curve (AUC) method was used to 
calculate an individual measure of delay discounting for each participant. Specifically, the areas 
under successive trapezoids formed by consecutive indifference points were calculated using the 
                                                 
1 Although sunk cost proportion is derived here by dividing sunk cost instances by escalation instances, 
recent evidence from fMRI research provides empirical support for this decision. During terminal link decisions, 
greater dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) activation, and reduced ventral medial prefrontal cortex activation 
(vmPFC), occurred after greater initial investments (Haller & Schwabe, 2014). Greater dlPFC activation during 
initial link responding negatively correlated with vmPFC activation in terminal link choices and in the sunk cost 
effect. The authors concluded that initial link dlPFC activation “overrides” vmPFC activation during terminal link 
responding that completes an instance of the sunk cost effect. Interestly, the vmPFC is differentially activated during 
smaller sooner rewards and the dlPFC larger later rewards during delay discounting choices (McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). In sum, dividing the sunk cost by escalation may control potential overlap between 




summed trapezoid method (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). Rachlin’s (2006) 
hyperboloid equation was not fit to the sunk cost proportion data because the data from 
individual participants did not always systematically decline as a function of temporal gaps. 
Mean sunk cost proportion at each temporal gap, however, was calculated for each participant. 
A t-test used to compare mean delay discounting (AUC) of participants in the low and 
high time perception groups revealed a significant difference in delay discounting between the 
low and high subjective time perception groups (t = -2.10,  p = .04). Specifically, participants 
with lower time perception group (i.e., perceived distant events as subjectively further from the 
present than their counterparts) discounted at higher rates than those in the high time perception 
group. For the sunk cost data, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was used wherein 
differences in sunk cost proportion was evaluated across subjective time perception groups 
(across subject) and temporal gaps (within subject). A main effect of temporal gap (F (3, 159) 
=8.73, p < .001) and subjective time perception group was found (F (1, 53) = 4.30, p = .04), 
however; there was not a significant interaction effect (F (3, 159) = 0.77, p = .51). Specifically, 
those in the low time perception group exhibited less sunk cost proportion compared to those in 
the high time perception group. Further, the main effect of temporal gap was such that sunk cost 
proportion typically declined as a function of increasing temporal gaps. 
The pilot study from Sofis and colleagues (under revision) provided three initial findings 
suggesting that the sunk cost and delay discounting may relate due to shared processes 
underlying subjective time perception. 1) First, sunk cost proportion generally decreased as a 
function of the time between the initial and terminal link. 2) Second, and more importantly, the 
sunk cost increased and delay discounting decreased in those who demonstrate greater levels of 
subjective time perception. In other words, those who perceived distant events as subjectively 
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closer to the present relative to others showed a greater propensity to exhibit the sunk cost effect 
and demonstrated lower rates of delay discounting. 3) Third, delay discounting did not directly 
correlate with any measure of the sunk cost (e.g., instances, proportion), suggesting that time 
perception may be critical process shared by delay discounting and the sunk cost. 
Verbal Behavior and Cross-Species Implication in Temporal Decision-Making 
Many psychologists argue that human’s alone demonstrate verbal behavior (Catania, 
1995; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Regardless of whether nonhuman animals exhibit 
verbal behavior, it is well established that humans demonstrate significantly more sophisticated 
patterns of verbal behavior (Catania, 1995, 2006). Further, the ability of humans to arbitrarily 
relate events has been proposed as a fundamental framework of verbal skills unique to humans 
(Hayes et al., 2001). As it relates to time, the ability of humans to make temporal discriminations 
such as Now-Then relations facilitates processes underlying human conceptualization of time 
(Biglan & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). The development of temporal verbal relations may even be 
fundamental to how humans make complex discriminations between past, present, and future 
(Friedman, 2000). Such distinctions are thought to contribute to a more complex repertoire 
underlying one’s ability to act in anticipation of possible future events and in reference to past 
events (Biglan & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). This differential verbal repertoire between humans and 
nonhuman animals has arguably been the most referenced explanation for differences observed 
in the level of delay discounting (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001) and sunk cost effect (Arkes & 
Ayton, 1999). The next two sections will discuss the implications of verbal behavior across 
human and nonhuman species for delay discounting and the sunk cost effect in turn. 
Verbal behavior and delay discounting.Despite several notable methodological 
differences between human and animal delay discounting paradigms, non-human animals tend to 
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discount at higher rates than humans (Jimura, Myerson, Hilgard, Braver, & Green, 2009). One 
methodological difference is that most discounting studies with human participants do not use 
real rewards and animal studies do so exclusively (Johnson & Bickel, 2002). In human delay 
discounting paradigms, experimenters typically rely on the verbal repertoires of human 
participants to provide a proxy of actual circumstances wherein delays and reward values are not 
fully experienced (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001; Dixon, Lik, Green, & Myerson, 2013; Lagorio & 
Madden, 2005). Indirect evidence for a species-specific role of verbal behavior comes from 
delay discounting studies wherein small changes to the verbal stimuli that make up the 
discounting result in altered rates of discounting (Magen et al., 2008a; Read, Frederick, Orsel, & 
Rahman, 2005). Delay discounting studies with human participants also tend to show similar 
responding between real and hypothetical rewards (cf. Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Madden, 
Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003). Further, human participants tend to discount real versus 
hypothetical rewards similarly regardless of whether procedures are trial-based, include steady 
state responding, or include high versus low proportions of real vs. hypothetical rewards 
(Madden et al., 2007).  Although verbal stimuli can impact rates of discounting (Magen et al., 
2008a; Read et al., 2005), the verbal stimuli appear to provide fairly close approximations to 
actual conditions to which they refer (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2003). 
Verbal behavior and the sunk cost effect.Whether the sunk cost effect can only occur 
in humans also continues to be widely debated (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Navarro & Fantino, 
2005). The ability of humans to discriminate compound verbal stimuli and rules has been 
hypothesized as one factor that contributes to the sunk cost effect in humans (Fantino, 1998). 
Research on the conjunction effect, typically considered a phenomenon specific to humans 
(Fantino, 1998), suggests that participants often indicate that the conjunction of two events are 
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more likely than just one of the events (Stolarz-Fantino, Fantino, & Kulik, 1996). Although few 
disagree that human capacity for verbal behavior influences the effect in humans, some have 
argued that this discrepancy is why the effect may not be possible in non-human animals (Arkes 
& Ayton, 1999). Although several operant researchers have reported demonstrating the effect, 
the procedures used leave notable room for debate as to whether all of the criteria of the sunk 
cost effect are met (Macaskill & Hackenberg, 2012; Navarro & Fantino, 2005). As discussed 
previously in the case of Navarro and Fantino (2005), researchers often do not differentiate 
between escalation and sunk cost. In other words, there is not sufficient experimental 
manipulation such that a differential effect of initial investment can be attributed to the 
likelihood of continued responding. Other studies have implemented procedures wherein 
multiple free-choice links are present, making unclear whether the initial link investment is 
clearly related to the propensity to complete terminal investments (White & Magalhaes, 2015).  
Further, Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, and Zentall (1999) provided simultaneous discrimination 
training in which stimuli paired with high versus low effort conditions were used to establish 
conditional discriminations of the effort conditions (i.e., the justification effect). During probe 
trials with non-differential reinforcement and both stimuli presented, the pigeons preferred the 
stimulus corresponding to the high effort condition. Interestingly, however, the findings observed 
in Clement et al. (2001) could not be replicated by a series of six studies by Vasconcelos, 
Urcuioli, and Lionello-DeNolf (2007). Despite inconsistent evidence for the justification effect 
in non-human animals, there is considerable evidence that the effect occurs in humans (Aronson 
& Mills, 1959; Takemura, 1993). Further, traditional definitions of justification effect are 
explicitly a function of complex social contexts in which verbal behavior is pervasive (Staw, 
1976). In sum, there is insufficient current evidence suggesting that animals are reliably capable 
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of committing the sunk cost effect. At the very least, it appears clear that the sunk cost effect 
may not be as easily observable in non-human animals as it is in humans. 
Most hypothesized explanations for the differential ease at which the sunk cost occurs in 
humans versus animals reference human sensitivity to verbal rules (Biglan & Barnes-Holmes, 
2015). Verbal rules, for example, have been shown to induce the sunk cost effect by emphasizing 
not wasting resources (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) or through justifying past bad decisions (Bragger 
et al., 1998; 2003). Further, verbal stimuli manipulating social-context, and relative presence of 
heuristics (e.g., “avoid wasting resources”) have all been shown to influence the relative 
likelihood of the sunk cost effect (Arkes, 1996). Further, the tendency for human subjects to 
prefer compound verbal stimuli to constituent stimuli has been shown to be a hallmark feature of 
reasoning and indicative of the sunk cost effect (Fantino, 1998). In other words, the general 
tendency for humans to display summation of stimuli may interact with verbal repertoires to 
differentially increase the likelihood of the sunk cost effect in humans. 
Competing Neurobehavioral Decision Systems.The Competing Neurobehavioral 
Decision Systems hypothesis (CNDS) holds that the relative balance between the impulsive 
(reward-driven, automatic) and executive (future-oriented, deliberate) systems strongly 
underpins maladaptive and adaptive decision-making (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Gatchalian, 
& McClure, 2012; Bickel et al., 2007; Bickel, Stein, et al., 2017a; Koffarnus, Jarmolowicz, 
Mueller, & Bickel, 2013; McClure et al., 2004). The CNDS hypothesis is derived in part from 
data showing that larger later choices during delay discounting tasks result in higher relative 
activation in the dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), while smaller sooner choices result in 
greater relative activation in the medial prefrontal cortex [(mPFC) (Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, & 
Angtuaco, 2009a; Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, & Angtuaco, 2009b; McClure et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 
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2004)]. Differential activation of these two regions corresponds strongly with planning and 
reward-driven behavior, respectively. Although the CNDS hypothesis is intricately linked to 
neural events observed during delay discounting tasks, there are several two-system theories of 
decision-making that resemble the CNDS model (see Bickel, Mellis, et al., 2017 for a review).  
A large body of evidence suggests that delay discounting and the neural substrates that facilitate 
it undergird treatment outcomes such as relapse (Stanger, Ryan, Fu, Landes, & Jones, 2012), 
treatment response (MacKillop & Kahler, 2009; Washio et al., 2011), and prospective prediction 
of drug use (Brody et al., 2014). As such, delay discounting is often discussed as a treatment 
target for interventions in applied or translational contexts (Koffarnus et al., 2013; Sheffer et al., 
2014).  
Interestingly, evidence from neuroimaging studies suggest that the sunk cost effect and 
escalation may also fit neatly within the existing framework of the CNDS theory. Specifically, 
during the sunk cost effect, initial link responding elicits dlPFC activity, the same region 
activated during larger later choices in delay discounting (Haller & Schwabe, 2014; Zeng, 
Zhang, Chen, Yuc, & Gong, 2013). Terminal link responding, however, elicits differential mPFC 
activity as a function of escalation amount, the same region activated during smaller, sooner 
choices in delay discounting (Haller & Schwabe, 2014; Zeng et al., 2013). These data not only 
provide supplemental evidence of the overlap between delay discounting and the sunk cost 
effect, but also suggest that the sunk cost effect can be incorporated into the CNDS framework. 
Narrative theory.One method of altering rates of delay discounting is with verbal 
framing designed to reduce impulsive system activation or increase executive system activation 
through altering corresponding changes in preference for immediate and delayed rewards, 
respectively. A growing body of literature suggests that verbal framing manipulations can alter 
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rates of temporal decision-making such as delay discounting (Bickel et al., 2016b; Magen, 
Dweck, & Gross, 2008b; Peters & Buchel, 2009; Radu et al., 2011; Read et al., 2005). Within the 
CNDS framework, such verbal frames can be categorized by four dimensions (see Bickel, Stein, 
et al., 2017b for a reivew). Specifically, the dimensions refer to who creates the narrative (i.e., 
experimenter or participant), who the narrative refers to (i.e., self or others), time (i.e., past, 
present, future), and valence [(positive or negative) (Bickel, Stein, et al., 2017a)]. Often, positive 
narratives about multiple future events are presented as cues during tasks such as delay 
discounting (Bickel, Stein, et al., 2017a; Daniel, Stanton, & Epstein, 2013; Stein et al., 2016). 
Researchers have shown that positively valenced episodic future thinking reduces delay 
discounting (Stein et al., 2016; Sze, Stein, Bickel, Paluch, & Epstein, 2017).  
A second verbal manipulation is the use of income narrative prompts designed to induce 
the perception of immediate scarcity or abundance conditions. Haushofer, Schunk, and Fehr 
(2013), for example, split participants into “rich” and “poor” groups, wherein participants were 
given low or high amounts of experimental cash that was later exchanged for actual money. 
After an effort-based task wherein participants earned extra experimental money, participants 
received either a positive, negative, or control income narrative. In other words, with the 
exception of the control income narrative group, participants were told that they either lost or 
gained a large amount of their experimental income. These statements corresponded with the 
participants actually losing or gaining that amount of experimental money. After being informed 
of their change in financial status, participants then played multiple additional rounds of the 
effort-task prior to completing a delay discounting procedure. The authors found that negative 
income shocks increased rates of discounting and to a lesser extent, positive income shocks 
decreased rates of discounting. Although Haushofer et al. (2013) used income narratives to 
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inform participants of the change in conditions, they also provided actual income shocks that 
corresponded with real monetary outcomes.  Therefore, it is difficult to determine to what degree 
the income narratives alone contributed to discounting differences between the groups. To that 
end, Bickel, Wilson, Chen, Koffarnus, and Franck (2016a) investigated the effects of negative, 
neutral, and positively valenced hypothetical income narratives without actual income shocks on 
delay discounting. The authors found that negative and positive income narrative groups showed 
higher and lower rates of discounting, respectively. Further, similar to the effects reported by 
Haushofer et al. (2013), the negative income narrative induced a greater effect on discounting 
than the positive income narrative. Additionally, in a factorial design, Sze et al. (2017) had 
groups of participants experience future, recent, or no episodic thinking conditions and either 
neutral or negative income narrative prior to completing a delay discounting task. Sze et al. 
(2017) replicated the previously described effects observed with episodic future thinking and 
negative income narratives (i.e., high rates of discounting with negative compared to neutral 
narratives). Additionally, participants who received episodic future thinking in the negative 
income narrative group showed decreased discounting rates compared to other participants in the 
negative income narrative group who received the recent or no episodic thinking manipulation.  
One potential process underlying effects of income narratives on discounting rates is a 
constriction of the temporal window in which events can be valued (Bickel et al., 2016b). 
Temporal window, however, is merely a byproduct of the rate at which one subjectively 
perceives objective time points as close to the present (Zauberman et al., 2009). In other words, 
temporal window can be conceptualized as the furthest point in time that one is capable of 
perceiving. Despite individual differences observed, the temporal attention hypothesis holds that 
subjective time perception and attention towards specific points in time are generally 
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symmetrical across future and past events (Radu et al., 2011). Additionally, attention directed 
towards specific points in time and subjective time perception are related but independent 
constructs (Bickel et al., 2016b; Rader, McCauley, & Callen, 2009; Stein et al., 2016). In other 
words, improvements in temporal window and subjective time perception are thought to shift 
temporal focus, and as a result, valuation towards temporally distant consequences (Kim & 
Zauberman, 2013; Rader et al., 2009; Radu et al., 2011; Stein et al., 2016; Zauberman et al., 
2009). The existing evidence, however, has only shown that larger temporal windows (i.e., 
perceiving distant events as subjectively closer to the present) correspond with lower rates of 
delay discounting (Kim & Zauberman, 2013; Sofis et al.; Zauberman et al., 2009) and greater 
levels of sunk cost (Sofis et al., under review). 
Those with a small temporal window (e.g., consider two weeks from now to be the 
“future”; Petry, Bickel, and Arnett (1998)) may not be capable of considering events past a given 
objective point in time. Such a deficit may result in a reduced sensitivity to long-term 
consequences. The ability to consider greater temporal windows, however, does not necessarily 
guarantee temporal attention towards distant events (Kim & Zauberman, 2013; Rader et al., 
2009). In Kim and Zauberman (2013), for example, immediate and delayed reward choices were 
presented independently and happiness scores were used in lieu of a binary choices between 
smaller sooner and larger later rewards. Notably, sexual arousal worsened subjective time 
perception (i.e. objective time points perceived as further away from the present), which 
corresponded with fewer reduced happiness scores only for the delayed rewards. The authors 
hypothesized that arousal may have shifted temporal attention, as evidenced by the concurrent 
changes in discounting and subjective time perception measures.  
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Unfortunately, however, little is known about which aspects or measures of time best 
characterize temporal window and subjective time perception of distant future and past events. 
Further, there is limited evidence evaluating how subjective time perception might relate delay to 
discounting. Additionally, the attention factor in temporal attention has generally been inferred 
by evaluating how given interventions alter delay discounting in comparison to control 
manipulations (Kim & Zauberman, 2013; Radu et al., 2011; Yi et al., 2006). One method of 
avoiding this limitation is to evaluate concurrent effects of a measure of temporal focus (i.e. 
orientation) and subjective time perception. As previously discussed, the Temporal Focus Scale 
(Shipp et al., 2009) may be ideal because it does not assume adaptive or maladaptive patterns 
apriori and the scale was created with the assumption that temporal attention is a dynamic and 
non-mutually exclusive. Finally, the subjective time perception and sunk cost effect paradigms 
reported by Sofis and colleagues (under revision) already demonstrate overlap with each other 
and delay discounting.  
Statement of Problem 
There were three primary questions related to the current study. First, would valenced 
income narrative prompts concurrently alter subjective time perception, sunk cost, and delay 
discounting,? In other words, would positive income narratives improve subjective time 
perception, resulting in decreased discounting and increased sunk cost? Similarly, would 
negative income narratives worsen subjective time perception, resulting in increased discounting 
and decreased sunk cost? Such findings would provide further support for the temporal attention 
hypothesis and were anticipated based on the findings reported by Sofis et al. (under revision), 
Sze et al. (2017), and Bickel et al. (2016b). Second, would the sunk cost decrease as a function 
of temporal gaps in a manner similar to the data observed in the pilot study by Sofis and 
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colleagues (under revision)? If the sunk cost effect is indeed a manifestation of temporal 
attention, then the general trend of decreasing sunk cost as a function of temporal gaps should be 
observed. Third, would delay discounting directly correlate with the sunk cost effect? Further, 
would the terminal amount of sunk costs differentially correlate with delay discounting? Would 
lower rates of discounting, for example, correlate with sunk cost instances of higher terminal link 
values, but not those of lower terminal link values? Unlike the pilot study from Sofis and 
colleagues (under revision), the current study used the terminal link values of $5, $30, $50, $75, 
and $105 to provide amounts more proximal (i.e., $50 and $75) and more distant (i.e., $105) 
from the trial mean ($73). Based on these goals, the proposed experiment investigated the effects 
of valenced income narratives (independent groups of positive, negative, or neutral narrative) 
and on subjective time perception (future and past), temporal focus, delay discounting, and the 
sunk cost effect. 
Methods 
Subjects  
A total of 205 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). 
Mturk is an online crowdsourcing marketplace wherein human intelligence tasks (HITs) are 
posted for mTurk workers to complete. Only workers who had records of at least 95% of their 
HITs accepted by requesters were used for the current study. A statistical power analysis was 
performed using GPower 3.1.9.2 to estimate the necessary sample size. Existing literature 
investigating the effects of income narratives on delay discounting was used to determine effect 
sizes because there is no available evidence to my knowledge evaluating the effects of income 
narratives on the sunk cost. The means and standard deviations of delay discounting rates 
reported in Haushofer & Fehr (2013) were used to calculate effect sizes for positive (ŋ2= 0.107) 
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and negative (ŋ2= 0.153) income shock (i.e., Ratio of positive to negative income shock = 70%; 
see Appendix A). Unfortunately, the addition of independent variable components (high and low 
experimental endowment groups) besides the income narratives in Haushofer & Fehr (2013) 
limited the generality of their effect sizes. Sze et al. (2017) reported partial eta-squared, but only 
used negative and neutral income narrative groups. The partial eta-squared from Sze et al. (2017) 
was translated to an effect size (Appendix B). Then, the 70% proportional difference in effect 
size between positive and negative narratives from Haushofer & Fehr (2013) was multiplied by 
the Sze et al. (2017) negative income shock partial eta-squared of .14 to arrive at an adjusted 
estimated partial eta-squared of .098 for the positive income condition (Appendix C). This was 
done to adjust the power appropriately to the lower relative effect of the positive income 
narrative on delay discounting. The estimated effect size of the positive income condition (i.e., ŋ2 
=.098, Cohen’s d = 0.33) was then used to estimate the necessary sample size because greater 
statistical power was assumed to be necessary to observe the effect of the positive income 
narrative compared to the negative narrative. With an alpha of 0.5 and power of 0.95, the sample 
size necessary to observe a significant effect of income narrative group on discount rate using a 
One-Way ANOVA was N =147. 
Participants were compensated $0.75 for completing all experimental procedures. 
Participants also received a bonus of $0.75 for passing at least once on terminal links. 
Participants were instructed in the informed consent and prior to completing the sunk cost task 
that they could receive $0.75 for attending to the sunk cost task. Specifically, they were told: 
Please note that you can earn an extra 75 cents (totaling $1.50) if you honestly and 
realistically answer during the task labeled, 'financial decision-making.' Based on our 
experience administering this task, we can identify if you are not attending. There are no 
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right or wrong answers, and if you are carefully attending to the questions, you will earn 
the bonus of 75 cents. We will remind you of these criteria prior to the “financial 
decision-making task."  
Following completion of the experimental tasks, participants were provided with a code 
that they used to acquire their compensation. Bonuses were provided within 24 hours of the 
completion of the experiment. 
Procedure 
Participants completed all experimental tasks online using Qualtrics survey software™. 
The university’s institutional review board approved all procedures used in the present 
experiment. Participants were provided with an information statement and then reported 
demographic information including age, height and weight, gender, race and ethnicity, income, 
education, and parent’s education during childhood. Participants were then provided with 
instructions regarding the $0.75 bonus, and the following summary: 
In this experiment, you will be asked to first read and envision yourself experiencing a 
hypothetical income-based scenario for 15 seconds. You will then be asked to write very briefly 
about how this hypothetical scenario might change your current financial situation. You will then 
be given four tasks and three surveys to complete. 
Following completion of the experimental tasks, participants were provided with a code 
to enter on the Amazon mTurk website to acquire their compensation. 
Income narrative conditions.Immediately after being presented with the instructions for 
the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either a positive, negative, or neutral 
income narrative condition. The income narratives were based off of those used by Sze et al. 
(2017) with minor modifications. Specifically, there was no reference to changes in living 
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situation in the income narratives. These were omitted so that the effects resulting from the 
hypothetical change in income would not be confused with those related to changes in living 
situation. In addition, the negative income narrative did not reference losing one’s job, but 
instead, oriented participants to a situation wherein their pay was lowered to a third of their 
current pay. This was to create more subjectively equivalent circumstances amongst those in the 
negative and positive income narrative groups. Lastly, the positive income narrative alluded to a 
threefold increase in pay, which was larger than the increase used in Sze et al. (2017), and was 
an equivalent change to the lowered payment used in the present experiment’s negative income 
narrative. Participants saw the following narratives based on their condition: 
• Positive: At your job you have just been promoted. You will be making three times more 
money than you previously were. 
• Negative: At your job, you have just been demoted. You will be making 1/3 of what you 
were making previously. 
• Neutral: At your job, you have just been transferred to a different department, but will 
make the same amount of money. 
After the initial presentation of the income narrative, participants responded to two 
questions regarding the narrative that were designed to individualize each participant’s narrative 
experience. The individualization of the income narrative responses was further designed to help 
enhance the effectiveness of the narratives on subsequent tasks (Sze et al., 2017). Participants 
were shown the income narrative again and responded to the following prompt: “Describe how 
your financial situation has changed based on this narrative. Write approximately 2-4 sentences.” 
Qualtrics response criteria were set such required that responses had to be at least 30 characters 
before the participant could proceed. Participants’ written responses to the income narratives 
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were then presented and participants were asked to rate their mood using a five-point scale 
featuring a face showing sad to happy, and participants were instructed, “Rate your current 
mood. All the way to the left is very sad, and all the way to the right is very happy.”  
The participants’ written responses to the income narrative were presented prior to the 
delay discounting, sunk cost effect, subjective time perception tasks, and temporal focus tasks. In 
addition, participants rated their mood prior to completing each of these tasks as a manipulation 
check. Participants completed subjective time perception and temporal focus tasks in order, 
respectively, prior to the delay discounting and sunk cost tasks, to potentially reduce the 
likelihood that the effect of the income narratives would have lost sensitivity prior to the time 
perception measures. The order of the delay discounting and sunk cost tasks were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Temporal focus scale.The temporal focus scale (TFS) is a 12-item scale designed to 
measure the relative degree to which participants attend to toward future, past, and current events 
(Shipp et al., 2009). All 12 items (four past, four present, four future) are rated using a 7-point 
scale (1= never; 3 = sometimes; 5 = frequently; 7 = constantly). Means of all items within past, 
present, and future factors are used as the primary dependent measures (Shipp et al., 2009). As 
reported by Shipp et al. (2009), the chi-squared test for a confirmatory factor analysis model was 
significant (p < .01). In addition, the authors reported that the comparative fit index (CFI) was 
.96, which is above the recommended criteria of .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). All factor loadings 
for were statistically significant with a median factor loading of .78, and the factor structure was 
replicated three times in Shipp et al. (2009). The authors established convergent validity with 
moderate to high correlations between each factor of the TFS (i.e., past, present, and future), and 
the corresponding factors of the ZTPI (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), and the Temporal Orientation 
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Scale (Holman & Silver, 1998). Test-retest validity was established by the authors by reassessing 
the scale with the same participants six weeks after the initial assessment, and strong positive 
correlations were found for past (r = .73), current (r = .66), and future (r = .72) mean scores.  
Predictive validity was established in study four, wherein temporal focus factors and past, 
present, and future measures of autonomy, pay, opportunities for advancement, and recognition 
at time point one. The current, present, and anticipated job characteristics and the temporal focus 
factors derived at time point one were then used to prospectively predict the outcomes of job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover intent at time point two (i.e., predictive 
validity). High future temporal focus interacted with several anticipated job characteristics at 
time point one to predict job satisfaction at time point two. Similarly, high past temporal focus 
interacted with each of the four job characteristics to negatively predict turnover intent at 
participant’s current job. Importantly, there were no interactions amongst the temporal focus 
measures, providing additional confidence that the temporal focus factors should be considered 
as three separate main effects (Shipp et al., 2009). Additional construct validity was provided in 
study two of Shipp et al. (2009), wherein past temporal focus was found to be negatively 
correlated with optimism and conscientiousness, and positively correlated with neuroticism. In 
contrast, future temporal focus was positively correlated with extraversion, conscientiousness, 
optimism, and risk-taking. The generality of the scale was furthered by replicating the factor 
structure across a range of ages, occupational status (student or working), and educational levels. 
Subjective time perception task.The subjective time perception task used in the current 
experiment was based off of the procedure described in Zauberman et al. (2009). The authors did 
not validate their measure of subjective time perception. In the current study, participants were 
asked to slide a tab along a visual analog scale to report how soon or how far away X time is 
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from now for both past and future temporal conditions (Appendix A). Participants were 
instructed: 
We are going to ask you a series of questions about how close or far certain times are 
from the present. We will ask you about time points in the past and the future (i.e., 1 day, 
1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, and 5 years). Please click okay if you understand 
these instructions. 
The temporal conditions probed in the subjective time perception tasked matched the five 
time periods used in the delay discounting task (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, and 5 
years).  Therefore, there was a total of 10 temporal conditions probed (5 for future and 5 for past 
temporal direction).  
Delay discounting task.Participants completed a version of a titrating amounts delay 
discounting task in which participants made choices between rewards to be received immediately 
and delayed rewards. Six delay conditions were used that matched the temporal distances used in 
the temporal sunk cost task and the subjective time perception task (i.e., 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 
6 months, 1 year, and 5 years). For each delay condition, participants made six choices between 
an immediate and delayed amount. First, they chose to receive either $500 now, or $1000 at the 
given delay. Within each delay condition, the delayed choice is always fixed and the immediate 
amount is changed based on the participant last choice. Specifically, if the participant chose the 
immediate reward option, then the immediate reward was reduced by half of the previous 
difference between the immediate and delayed options for the next trial (i.e. 50% of $1000-$500 
is $250). Therefore, the participant chose between $250 now and $1000 after a given delay. 
When the participant chose the delayed option, the immediate reward was increased by half of 
the previous difference. Therefore, the participant chose between $750 now and $1000 after the 
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same delay. The immediate reward amount was titrated for six consecutive trials, including the 
first choice between $500 now and $1000 after a delay. This process was then repeated for each 
of the six delays in ascending order. The subjective value of the delayed $1000 amount was 
calculated by taking the midpoint of the final immediate reward chosen and the last amount of 
the immediate reward that had been forgone (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002). 
Temporal sunk cost task.The temporal sunk cost task (similar to that described by Sofis, 
Lemley, and Jarmolowicz (under revision), featured a series of two-link decision-making trials. 
The program first presented the following written instructions:  
Imagine that your job entails completing work projects and that you do not get 
any significant amount of income from any other source. Your department has been given 
a budget of $4,330 dollars. It is your responsibility to best allocate the budget to complete 
projects. Your goal is to efficiently complete 50 projects while saving the company 
money. 
Your work projects entail investing money from your project budget (seen in the 
upper right corner of your screen) to complete individual projects. The costs will vary 
from project to project. You must pay the cost to start each project, but then you will 
have the choice to either complete the investment or opt out of completing that 
investment. 
When you are working on projects, you will be told to think about how long ago 
you began each project. For some projects, you will assume that you have just begun 
them. For others, you will be instructed to imagine that you began the project some time 
ago. Please consider these instructions when choosing whether to complete projects. 
If you understand these instructions, please click okay. 
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The two-link decision-making trials were identical to those used in the pilot study by 
Sofis, et al. (under revision), except for changes to the temporal conditions and terminal link 
amounts. Specifically, unlike the pilot study, the hypothetical temporal gaps between initial and 
terminal links matched four of the temporal distances used in the delay discounting and 
subjective time perception tasks (i.e., 1 week, 1 month 1 year, and 5 years). Further, a $50 
terminal investment was added and the $20 terminal investment was increased to $30 to 
potentially create more challenging decisions as to whether or not to persist. In other words, 
almost all $5 and $20 terminal investments in the pilot study were completed, suggesting that 
those terminal investment amounts were not inducing passing. For the sunk cost effect to occur, 
participants must pass on LI links. Therefore, the addition of the $50 and the change from $20 to 
$30 was designed to induce decisions that are more difficult and ideally, sunk cost instances at 
lower terminal values. Lastly, the $80 terminal investment and the $95 terminal investment were 
changed to $75 and $105, respectively. These alterations were made to increase the likelihood 
that differences between sunk cost instances at low ($75) and high ($105) terminal values would 
be observed. In other words, the changes in terminal link amounts resulted in a new trial mean of 
$73 (initial link = $20, terminal link = $53), which is only $2 lower than the lower of the two 
escalation amounts (i.e. $75) and $32 removed from the higher of the two escalation amounts 
(i.e. $105). Due to the anticipated increase in sunk cost instances at lower terminal link values, 
the sunk cost proportion measure used in the current study included completed investments at all 
terminal link amounts, instead of only escalation instances in the denominator. Each set of five 
rounds is a block (i.e., 50 trials). 
Text describing the two-link decision-making trials was shown in the center of the screen 
(Appendix B). Text in the upper left-hand corner depicted the number of projects the participant 
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has completed, and text in the upper right-hand corner displayed funds the participant could 
invest in projects ($4,330 to start). As an attempt to incentivize participants passing on some 
projects, a total budget of $4,330 was chosen because if a participant invested in 66.67% of 
trials, then they had to complete 84 initial investments (84 x 20 = x) to complete 50 projects (50 
x 53 = x).  
All possible combinations of initial ($5 or $35; average initial investment = $20) and 
terminal ($5, $30, $50, $75, or $105; average terminal investment = $53) investments constituted 
a round of two-link decision-making trials (ten trials total); the order of combinations of initial 
and terminal investments within each round was presented randomly. 
Prior to starting each round, text informed the participant “Now imagine you started these 
projects X.” The value of X changed in ascending order across rounds: now, 1 week, 1 month, 1 
year, and 5 years. Additionally, prior to starting each time condition, participants were asked 
“When did you start these projects?” Participants had to select the correct answer from a list in 
order to proceed to the decision-making trials for that round. Further, text in the terminal link of 
each trial prompted, “You started this project X” to remind participants of the time condition in 
which they were responding.  
In the initial link of each trial, the Qualtrics program presented a hypothetical investment 
amount, and participants pressed a button immediately below this amount labeled “Invest” 
followed by an arrow button to advance the terminal link. Advancing to the terminal link 
subtracted initial link costs from the participant’s funds. The terminal link showed the amount of 
additional investment (and buttons with the option to “Pass” (lower right-hand corner) or 
“Invest” (lower left-hand corner). If a participant invested in the terminal link, the costs were 
subtracted from their funds and the number of projects was incremented by one. After a choice to 
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invest or pass, text appeared informing the participant of the number of projects completed with 
an arrow button; clicking this button advanced the participant to the next two-link decision-
making trial. Participants completed at least two sets of two-link decision-making trials for every 
time period (i.e., 50 two-link trials, eight each for now, 1 week, 1 month, 1 year, and 5 years), 
and continued investing until they completed 50 projects. 
Data Analysis 
Curves were fit using GraphPad Prism version 7. All statistical analyses were performed 
using SPSS version 25 or GraphPad Prism version 7. 
Delay discounting task.The hyperbolic (Equation 1) and Rachlin’s hyperboloid model 
(Equation 2) were fit to the median indifference data for each income narrative group using the 
Discounting Tool Selector (Gilroy, Franck, & Hantula, 2017). The Discounting Tool Selector 
ranks discounting models based on the respective probability that each model provides the best 
fit to the data. The Discounting Tool Selector compares model fits using Bayesian Information 
Criterion (Schwarz, 1978) to estimate the likelihood that the each of the various models are the 
best fit to the discounting data (Gilroy et al., 2017). The best fit model to the group indifference 
data was then used to determine k values for all participants.  If the hyperboloid model provided 
the best fit to the data, then the s parameter for each participant was shared across the entire 
sample so that only the k parameter was free to vary. Additionally, the best fit curves for the 
income narrative groups were further compared using extra-sum-of-squares F tests to determine 
whether individual curves or one curve was a better fit to the group data. To avoid confusing Ln 
(k) parameters for individual participant delay discounting, past subjective time perception, and 
future subjective time perception, delay discounting rate will be abbreviated by Ln (kdisc), past 
subjective time perception by Ln (kpast), and future subjective time perception by Ln (kfut). 
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Subjective time perception.For each temporal distance (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 
months, 1 year, 5 years), and temporal direction (i.e., future and past), participants’ reported how 
close or far the objective time points were on a scale of 0-1000. Data from the visual analogue 
scale was then reverse scored (1000 = very close and 0 = very far). Data were reverse scored to 
permit fitting a hyperbolic curve using Mazur’s (1987) hyperbolic model (Equation 1), where A 
will be 1000, which corresponds to the maximal valuation, d will be the temporal distance (x-
axis), and v was each participant’s subjective time perception (y-axis). Because researchers have 
found that time perception directly underlies the shape of hyperbolic discounting curves (Kim & 
Zauberman, 2009; Zauberman et al., 2009), a separate measures of time perception were derived 
for future (Ln (kfut)) and past (Ln (kpast)) subjective time perception for each participant. 
Hyperbolic discounting of mean temporal distances for each income narrative group were also 
calculated.  
Temporal sunk cost task.Mean investment percentage for each initial-terminal link 
combination on escalation trials were determined for each of the five time conditions (now, 1 
week, 1 month, 1 year, and 5 years). Sunk cost instances were defined in an identical fashion to 
Sofis and colleagues (under revision), except the terminal amount of a sunk cost instance could 
be any of the terminal link values (i.e., $5, $30, $50, $75, $105). In other words, a pass on a trial 
with a $5 initial link and $30 terminal link, followed by a completed investment of a trial with a 
$35 initial link and a $30 terminal link, would count as an instance of the sunk cost effect.  
Sunk cost proportion was calculated by dividing sunk cost instances plus one by the 
number of terminal investments plus one. Unlike the sunk cost proportion measure used in the 
pilot study by Sofis and colleagues (under revision), investments at all terminal link values, 
instead of only escalation values, were used in the denominator of this measure. This adjustment 
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was made in anticipation of observing a broader continuum of sunk cost instances across 
terminal link amounts. Mean sunk cost instances and sunk cost proportion across temporal gaps 
were both measured to calculate a curve for each income narrative group if each group showed a 
consistent declining pattern across temporal gaps.  
If either sunk cost instances or sunk cost proportion did show a consistent declining 
pattern across temporal gaps, then mean sunk cost instances and sunk cost proportion collapsed 
across temporal gaps was calculated. In addition, sunk cost instances and sunk cost proportion 
across temporal gaps for each participant were calculated using the area under the curve (AUC) 
approach. The areas under successive trapezoids formed by consecutive sunk cost data points 
across temporal gaps were calculated for each participant using an adjusted version of the 
summed trapezoid method (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). Due the presence of a 
sunk cost value at the “now” temporal gap, the first x-y coordinate was the sunk cost value in the 
“now” temporal gap condition. The x coordinates for the remaining conditions were the actual 
temporal gaps (days). If a consistent declining pattern was demonstrated across temporal gaps, 
then the fits of the hyperbolic model (Equation 1) and Rachlin’s (2006) hyperboloid model 
(Equation 2) were compared using Graph Pad Prism. Akaike’s information criteria corrected 
(AICc) was used to determine the best fitting model. For each income narrative group, the A 
parameter was set to the mean sunk cost in the now condition, and the d parameter represented 
the temporal gaps. The best fit model to the group sunk cost data across temporal gaps was then 
used to determine k values for individual participant curves. If the hyperboloid model (Rachlin, 
2006) was the better model, then s parameter would be shared across all participants so that the k 
parameter would be free to vary. Additionally, the best-fit curves were compared across income 
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narrative groups for mean sunk cost instance data using extra-sum-of-squares F tests to 
determine whether individual curves or one curve fit to the group data was a better fit.  
Comparisons.Temporal distance, sunk cost instance, and indifference data were 
aggregated across each of their respective time points for each income narrative group. The 
model (i.e., hyperbolic or hyperboloid) that best fit the data or could be fit to the data, was used 
for each measure. Then Ln (k) values from each measure were derived from curves 
corresponding to each of the income narrative groups. Extra sum-of-squares F tests were then 
used to determine whether a single curve or separate curves for each income narrative group 
better fit the data for each measure. 
Natural log-transformed k values were derived for individual participant delay 
discounting (Ln (kdisc), past subjective time perception (Ln (kpast)), future subjective time 
perception (Ln (kfut)) and sunk cost instances to correct for distribution and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests were re-run to test for normality. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were used to test for 
normality; non-parametric statistical alternatives (e.g., Spearman’s rank order correlation, Mann-
Whitney U, Kruskal Wallis H, Quade ANCOVA) were used for non-normally distributed 
variables. Chi-square and non-parametric one-way ANOVA (i.e., Kruskal Wallis H) tests were 
performed to test for differences in demographic variables across income narrative groups. Any 
demographic variables that were significantly different across income narrative groups were used 
as covariates in any of the ANCOVAs used to evaluate for effects of income narrative group on 
subjective time perception, temporal focus, delay discounting, sunk cost instances, and sunk cost 
proportion. Specifically, there was one independent factor (i.e., income narrative group), and a 
main effect of income group is expected for each dependent measure. Post-hoc comparisons 
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were used to evaluate differences between income narrative groups of time perception, temporal 
focus, delay discounting, and sunk cost.  
Existing research suggests that education (de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & 
Manuck, 2007), income (Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 1996), age (Steinberg et al., 
2009), BMI (Jarmolowicz et al., 2014), and ethnicity (Andrade & Petry, 2014) may relate to 
delay discounting such that less education, lower incomes, younger ages, and minority ethnicities 
have been linked to higher rates of discounting. Regardless of whether statistically significant 
relations were observed with delay discounting, the covariates of education (no 4-year degree, 4-
year degree), personal income (below, above U.S. median), age (continuous), BMI (continuous), 
and ethnicity (non-minority, minority) were used as covariates in a one-way ANCOVA with 
delay discounting rate (Ln (kdisc)) as the dependent measure and income narrative group as the 
fixed factor. Similar ANCOVA tests were run for the other dependent variables of interest (i.e., 
future and past subjective time perception, temporal focus, and sunk cost). Covariates were not 
added, however, to the ANCOVA models testing the other primary dependent measures unless 
statistically significant effects were demonstrated between the covariate and the dependent 
measure of interest.  
Results 
 A total of 205 participants completed the experiment on Amazon mTurk. Of those 205 
initial participants, 48 participants were excluded, leaving a final total of 157 participants. A 
power analysis revealed at least 147 participants were necessary to have sufficient statistical 
power. Specifically, based on the exclusionary criteria from Johnson and Bickel (2002), 25 
participants were excluded for inconsistent indifference points on the delay discounting 
procedure. Of those exclusions, nine of those participants always picked the larger later reward 
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and 16 of those participants reported an indifference point that was at least $200 greater than the 
indifference point at the previous delay. An additional eight participants were excluded for 
always choosing to invest in terminal links during the sunk cost task. Lastly, 15 participants were 
excluded for reporting a temporal distance on the future or past time perception task that was 5% 
or more than the previous temporal point (e.g., reporting that one year is closer to the present 
than one month). The 15 excluded participants for time perception also included those who 
always indicated 0 (proximal anchor) or 100 (distal anchor) for all time points for either future or 
past time perception.  
Normality and income narrative group covariates.All variables except future time 
perception (Ln (kfut)) and future temporal focus were non-normally distributed. Non-parametric 
tests were used for all analyses involving non-normally distributed data. One-way non-
parametric Quade ANCOVAs were performed to compare means of individual participant delay 
discounting, sunk cost, future and past time perception, and temporal focus factors across income 
narrative conditions. Mann-Whitney U tests were used to determine potential differences in 
discounting, sunk cost, future or past time perception, and temporal focus factors across the 
dichotomous variables of demographic variables of income, education, and ethnicity. Non-
parametric Spearman’s rank order coefficients were used to determine potentially significant 
correlations between BMI or age and discounting, sunk cost, future or past time perception, and 
temporal focus factors.  
Demographics..Table 2 shows means, standard deviations, and significance values 
derived from a series of Kruskal-Wallis H tests investigating potential differences in BMI, age, 
and time to complete experiment across income narrative groups. There were no significant 
differences in age (H (2, 156) = 0.37, p = .83) or completion time of the experiment (H (2, 156) 
 
47 
= 1.17, p = .56) across income narrative groups. There were, however, significant differences in 
BMI (H = (2, 156) = 6.10, p = .047). Post-hoc comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests showed 
no significant differences in BMI between neutral and positive income narrative groups (U = 
1346, p = .62), or  between neutral and negative income narrative groups (U = 982.5, p = .07), 
however, there was a significant difference in BMI between those in the negative and those in 
the positive group (U = 1049.5, p = .02). Specifically, those in the positive income narrative 
group had higher BMIs on average than those in the negative income narrative group. BMI was 
therefore used as a covariate in all tests comparing means of any dependent variable across 
income narrative groups. 
The demographic variables of education (no 4-year degree, 4-year degree), personal 
income (below, above U.S. median), ethnicity (non-minority, minority), and work-status (full-
time, not full-time) were coded in a dichotomous fashion consistent with previous established 
qualitative cut-offs ( e.g., Andrade & Petry, 2014). Table 3 shows sample sizes, relative 
percentages of the sample for the overall sample and for each income narrative group. In 
addition, significance values derived from Pearson’s chi-squared tests of potential differences in 
gender, ethnicity, education, income, and employment status across the income narrative groups 
are shown in the far right column of Table 3. For categorical variables, Pearson’s chi-squared 
tests showed no significant differences across income narrative groups in education (X2 (2, 156) 
= 1.58, p = .45), income (below or above the nationwide median income (X2 (2, 156) = 2.15, p = 
.34)), employment status (X2 (2, 154) = 0.93, p = .63), gender (X2 (2, 156) = 0.00, p = .99), or 
minority status (X2 (2, 154) = 2.79, p = .25). 
Model fitting and dependent measures.   
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Delay discounting.Rachlin’s (2006) hyperboloid model was selected as the model with 
highest probability to be the best fit for the median indifference data for the negative (99%; AIC 
= -29.73, R2 = .99), neutral (99%; AIC = -28.91, R2 = .99), and the positive group (71%; AIC = -
30.77, R2 = .99), respectively. Rachlin’s (2006) hyperboloid model was therefore used to model 
the median indifference points for each income narrative group and to determine discounting 
rates for each individual participant. To calculate individual discounting curves, the s parameter 
was shared across all participants and the k parameter was left unconstrained. The s parameter 
was shared across all participants so that comparisons of the mean of individual k parameters for 
each income group could be made in isolation. The shared s parameter was 0.901.  
Subjective time perception.Mean and median temporal distances for future and past time 
perception were calculated for each income narrative group across the time points of one day, 
one week, one month, one months, one year, and five years. Hyperbolic models were used for 
each of the income narrative groups. For median values, the hyperbolic model fit the data well 
for the negative income narrative group in the future (RMSE = 8.96, R2 = .92) and past (RMSE = 
6.63, R2 = .96). Median values in the neutral income group were well fit to the future (RMSE = 
10.62, R2 = .86) and past (RMSE = 6.65, R2 = .96) time perception. The hyperbolic model fit the 
positive income narrative group data well in the future (RMSE = 9.31, R2 = .89) and past (RMSE 
= 5.62, R2 = .97). The hyperbolic discounting model also fit individual participants’ temporal 
distance data well for future (Mean RMSE = 8.86, SD = 3.74, Mean R2 = .76, SD = 0.40) and 
past temporal directions (Mean RMSE = 9.70, SD = 4.38, Mean R2 = .81, SD = 0.46). 
Sunk cost instances.Mean sunk cost instances at each temporal condition and across 
income narrative groups were calculated prior to using an AIC test to compare whether the 
hyperboloid or hyperbolic model was the superior fit. The hyperboloid model was the superior fit 
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for the negative (p = 99.99%, RMSE = 0.01, R2 = .99), neutral (p = 99.99%, RMSE = 0.04, R2 = 
.99), and positive (p = 99.99%, RMSE= 0.06, R2 = .95) income narrative groups. Rachlin’s 
(2006) hyperboloid model was therefore used to evaluate mean sunk cost instances across the 
income narrative groups. For each hyperboloid curve for each income narrative group, the A 
parameter was set to the mean sunk cost in the now condition for that group, and the d parameter 
represented the temporal gaps (x-axis) that corresponded with mean sunk cost (y-axis) at each 
time point.  
Sunk cost instances and sunk cost proportion was calculated for each of the terminal link 
amounts (i.e., $5, $30, $50, $75, and $105), temporal gaps (i.e., now, one week ago, one month 
ago, one year ago, and five years ago) and income narrative groups (i.e., negative, neutral, and 
positive). Sunk cost proportion was calculated in identical fashion to the method used in the pilot 
study. Specifically, sunk cost instances plus a constant of one was divided by escalation 
instances divided by a constant of one. Similar to the pilot study, the total number of sunk cost 
instances and an total sunk cost proportion measure were calculated for each participant’s sunk 
cost data. Many participants showed irregular or non-declining sunk cost data across temporal 
gaps, preventing fits of hyperbolic and hyperboloid models. Therefore, the area under the curve 
(AUC) approach was used to assess the combined sunk cost totals across the temporal gaps for 
each participant. This approach was used for the dependent measures of sunk cost instance and 
sunk cost proportion.  
Pre-task mood scores.Figure 5 shows mood scores taken prior to temporal focus, time 
perception, delay discounting, and sunk cost measures. Mean mood scores (y-axis) are shown as 
a function of income narrative group (x-axis) for the measures of temporal focus (white bars), 
time perception (light grey bars), delay discounting (medium grey bars), and sunk cost (dark grey 
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bars). Quade ANCOVA tests with BMI as a covariate and income narrative group as the fixed 
factor were used to evaluate potential differences in mood scores reported prior to time 
perception, temporal focus, sunk cost, and delay discounting. Significant main effects were 
found for mood prior to time perception (F (2, 153) = 327, p < .0001), temporal focus (F (2, 
151) = 356, p < .0001), sunk cost (F (2, 152) = 293, p < .0001), and delay discounting (F (2, 
150) = 295, p < .0001) tasks. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that for each measure, 
mood scores were greater for the neutral group than the negative income narrative group (p < 
.0001), greater for the positive group compared to the neutral group (p < .0001), and greater for 
the positive group compared to the negative group (p < .0001).  
Mood scores prior to the delay discounting task negatively correlated with delay 
discounting rate (rs = -.18, p = .03). Mood prior to the temporal focus task was negatively 
correlated with current temporal focus (rs = -.17, p = .03), but not future (rs = .00, p = .98) or 
past (rs = -.10, p = .23) temporal focus. Mood scores prior to the sunk cost task did not correlate 
with any of the sunk cost measures (rs > |-.14|, p > .08). Finally, mood scores prior to the 
subjective time perception tasks did not correlate with either future (rs = -.06, p = .49) or past 
subjective time perception (rs = -.12, p = .15).  
The sunk cost effect across narrative groups.The left panel of Figure 6 shows mean 
sunk cost instances (y-axis) across temporal gaps (x-axis) and the income narrative groups of 
negative (open circles with heavily dotted line), neutral (open squares with solid line), and 
positive (open triangles with lightly dotted line) conditions. The hyperboloid curve (Rachlin, 
2006) was fit to the data by sharing the s parameter across groups and comparing for differences 
in the k parameter. An extra sum-of-squares F test showed that one hyperboloid curve did not fit 
as well as three independent curves for the three respective income narrative groups (F (2, 11) = 
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14.17, p < .001). For post-hoc comparisons of hyperboloid fits, the same s parameter value (i.e., 
0.25) from the first analysis was used as the shared s parameter to isolate potential differences 
observed in k values. Post-hoc extra sum-of-squares F tests showed that the negative and neutral 
groups’ sunk cost fits were better fit by one curve (F (1, 8) = 0.30, p = .60), however; two curves 
were more appropriate than one when comparing positive and negative groups (F (1, 8) = 20.68, 
p = .002) and positive and neutral income groups (F (1, 8) = 17.00, p = .003).   
Non-parametric Quade ANCOVA models were used to test for significant differences in 
sunk cost instances and sunk cost proportion, and mean terminal investment. There was not a 
significant main effect for sunk cost instances (F (2, 154) = 0.39, p = .68), sunk cost proportion 
(F (2, 154) = 0.32, p = .73), or mean terminal investment percentage (F (2, 154) = 0.35, p = .71). 
When using the AUC as the dependent measure of individual participant data, a non-parametric 
Quade ANCOVA model failed to demonstrate a significant effect of condition on sunk cost 
instances (AUC) (F (2, 154) = 0.62, p = .54) and sunk cost proportion (AUC) (F (2, 154) = 2.65, 
p = .07). 
None of the sunk cost related measures were normally distributed before or after natural 
log transformation or square root transformation of the data. None of the sunk cost measures 
were significantly correlated with age or BMI (r < |.12|, p > .15). Categorical demographic 
covariates were determined by using Mann-Whitney U tests were used to compare sunk cost 
instances, sunk cost proportion, and mean terminal investment percentage across the potential 
covariates of education (no 4-year degree, 4-year degree), personal income (below, above U.S. 
median), and ethnicity (non-minority, minority). In addition, due to the specific work-related 
context of the task, employment status (full-time work, not full-time) a series of Mann-Whitney 
U tests were used to evaluate work status as a potential covariate for each of the sunk cost 
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measures. Significant covariates were the effect of education on sunk cost instances (U = 2298, p 
= .049), sunk cost proportion (U = 2289.5, p = .046), sunk cost instances (AUC) (U = 2218, p = 
.03), and the effect of minority status on sunk cost proportion (AUC) (U= 1285.5, p = .04). 
Therefore, education was added as a covariate only when sunk instances, sunk cost instances 
(AUC), sunk cost proportion, and sunk cost proportion (AUC) were the dependent variables. 
Figure 7 shows mean number of sunk cost instances (y-axis) as a function of temporal 
gap (x-axis) and negative (open circles with light dashed lines), neutral (open squares with solid 
lines), and positive (open triangles with heavy dashed lines) income narrative groups. A two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of temporal gap (F (4, 616) = 
32.77, p < .0001), but not across income narrative groups (F (2, 154) = 0.14, p = .87). 
Delay discounting across narrative groups.The right panel of Figure 6 shows median 
indifference points across (y-axis) across delays (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 1 year, 5 years) and 
income groups of negative (open circles with heavily dotted line), neutral (open squares with 
solid line), and positive (open triangles with lightly dotted line) conditions. The analyses were 
identical to that of the mean sunk cost data in the left panel. The hyperboloid curve (Rachlin, 
2006) was fit to the data by sharing the s parameter across groups and comparing for differences 
in the k parameter. An extra sum-of-squares F test showed a significant main effect suggesting 
that three curves fit the group discounting data better than one curve (F (2, 14) = 11.85, p = 
.001). The shared s parameter value (0.82) was then used as the shared s parameter for the post-
hoc comparisons between income narrative conditions. Post-hoc extra sum-of-squares F tests 
revealed a significant difference between negative and neutral groups discounting fits (F (1, 10) 
= 8.03, p = .02), positive and negative groups (F (1, 10) = 26.19, p < .001), but not positive and 
neutral income groups (F (1, 10) = 4.75, p = .054).  
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Individual participant delay discounting rates (Ln (kdisc) were not normally distributed. 
Discounting rate (Ln (kdisc)) did not correlate with any of the continuous demographic variables 
(all r < |.11|, all p > .18) or show any differences across categorical demographic variables when 
using Mann-Whitney U tests (all U < 2820, all p > .36). A non-parametric ANOVA Kruskal-
Wallis test failed to demonstrate a main effect of income narrative group on delay discounting (H 
(2) = 3.16, p = .21). Income, education, age, BMI and ethnicity were added as covariates to a 
second Quade non-parametric ANCOVA model with delay discounting rate as the dependent 
variable and income narrative group as the group factor. The overall model was also not 
statistically significant (F (2, 152) = 2.41, p = .09). 
Subjective time perception across narrative groups.Figure 8 shows mean (top row) 
and median (bottom row) temporal distances for both future (left column) and past (right 
column) time points. When using an extra sum-of-squares F test to compare the k parameters of 
time perception across the three income narrative groups, there were no significant differences 
for future means (F (2, 15) = 0.13, p = .88), past means (F (2, 15) = 0.59, p = .56), future 
medians (F (2, 15) = 0.33, p = .72), or past medians (F (2, 15) = 0.66, p = .53), thus they are 
better fit by one curve than by separate ones. Further, there were no significant differences 
between future and past means (F (1, 10) = 0.22, p = .65) and future and past medians (F (1, 10) 
= 0.36, p = .56). Lower temporal distances (e.g., 15 on the visual analogue scale of 0-100) 
correspond to a perception that the given time point is relatively close to the present, whereas 
higher raw temporal distances (e.g., 85) correspond to a perception that the given time point is 
far removed from the present. Temporal distances were reverse scored to facilitate the plotting 
hyperbolic functions. With the reverse scoring, greater temporal distances correspond to 
perceptions that the given time point is relatively close to the present whereas lower temporal 
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distances correspond to perceptions that the given time point is relatively far from the present. In 
other words, greater temporal distances correspond to what has previously been discussed as 
greater temporal attention (Zauberman et al., 2009). The reverse scoring of temporal distances 
also allows hyperbolic fits to be used derive k parameters in a similar direction as delay 
discounting, such that lower k values correspond to lower rates of discounting. Hyperbolic fits 
were used to fit the mean and median temporal distances as the hyperbolic function fit the data 
better than the hyperboloid model. For future time perception (Ln (kfut)), a one-way ANCOVA 
failed to demonstrate a significant effect of income narrative group (F (2, 154) = 1.03, p = .36). 
For past time perception (Ln (kpast), a non-parametric one-way Quade ANCOVA also failed to 
demonstrate a significant effect (F (2, 150) = 1.01, p = .37). Categorical demographic covariates 
were determined by using Mann-Whitney U tests were to compare past subjective time 
perception (Ln (kpast)) across the potential covariates of education (no 4-year degree, 4-year 
degree), personal income (below, above U.S. median), ethnicity (non-minority, minority), and 
employment status (full-time work, not currently working). For past subjective time perception 
(Ln (kpast)), there were significant effects of full/not-full timework status (U = 2283.5, p = .04), 
education (U = 2267.5, p = .04), and ethnicity (U = 1132, p = .01). Specifically, those working 
full-time, of minority status, and with lower levels of education viewed objective time points in 
the past as further removed (subjectively) than non-minorities. For future subjective time 
perception (Ln (kfut)), t-tests were used to evaluate the effects of potential covariates on future 
time perception. There were no significant differences in future subjective time perception (Ln 
(kfut)) as a function of education, income, or full-time work status (p > .28), however; there were 
significant differences based on ethnicity (t = -2.51, p = .02). Specifically, those with minority 
status viewed objective time points in the future as further removed (subjectively) than non-
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minorities. For the continuous variables of age and BMI, spearman’s rank order correlations 
showed that past subjective time perception (Ln (kpast)) was not related to BMI (rs = -.01, p = 
.95), or age (rs = -.15, p = .06). Future time perception (Ln (kfut)) did not significantly correlate 
with BMI (rs = .05, p = .56), but showed a significant negative relation to age (rs = -.21, p = .01). 
For future subjective time perception (Ln (kfut)), the negative relation to age was such that 
younger individuals perceived objective time points as being further from the present than their 
older counterparts.  
Temporal focus across narrative groups.A one-way non-parametric Quade ANCOVA 
did not result in a significant main effect for past (F (2, 154) = 1.37, p = .26) or current temporal 
focus (F (2, 154) = 3.03, p = .051). A one-way ANCOVA F test for future temporal focus also 
failed to show a significant effect of income narrative (F (2, 156) = 0.12, p = .89). Categorical 
demographic covariates were determined by using Mann-Whitney U tests to compare mean past 
and current temporal focus (non-normally distributed) across education (no 4-year degree, 4-year 
degree), personal income (below, above U.S. median), and ethnicity (non-minority, minority). T-
tests were used to compare mean future temporal focus (normally distributed) across the same 
dichotomous variables. When comparing across the two education groups, significant differences 
were observed for future (t = -2.04, p = .043), but not current (U = 2308.5, p = .06) or past focus 
(U= 2641.5, p = .49). There were no significant differences observed when comparing any 
temporal focus measures across income groups (p > .15) or ethnicity (p > .12). Spearman rank-
order correlations were used to compare past, current, and future temporal focus to age and BMI. 
Age was significantly negatively correlated with future (rs = -0.23, p = .004) and past (rs = -.22, 
p = .005) temporal focus, but not current temporal focus (rs = .14, p = .086). There were no 
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significant correlations between BMI and the temporal focus scores (p > .11), however; BMI was 
still included due the significant differences in BMI observed across income narrative groups.  
Subjective time perception and temporal focus.Collapsed across all participants, Table 
4 shows correlation coefficients amongst past, current, and future temporal focus, future and past 
subjective time perception (Ln (kpast)). Past and future temporal focus were significantly 
positively correlated (r = .41, p < .001) and past and future subjective time perception were 
significantly positively correlated (r = .74, p < .001). There were statistically significant 
correlations between temporal focus and subjective time perception measures. 
Figure 9 shows future time perception (Ln (kfut)) on the x-axis and past time perception 
(Ln (kpast)) on the y-axis. A spearman’s rank order correlation resulted in a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the two measures (rs = .73, p < .0001). A linear 
regression line is plotted as well to illustrate the correlation (rs = .62, p < .0001). 
Aggregate sunk cost.No significant differences were observed across income narratives 
groups for any measure of sunk cost. Due to the lack of significant differences, the effects of 
temporal gap conditions and terminal link amounts on sunk cost instances, sunk cost proportion, 
and meant terminal investment percentage were collapsed across income narrative groups. To 
evaluate the effects of temporal gaps and terminal link amounts on each of the sunk cost 
measures, two sets of analyses were performed. First, a series of two-way repeated measures 
ANOVAs were performed despite the non-parametric nature of the sunk cost measures. The two-
way ANOVAs were performed to reduce the likelihood of type I error that could be observed by 
using separate one-way non-parametric ANOVAs to test for main effects of temporal gaps and 
terminal link amounts. Second, because two-way repeated measures ANOVA tests are not robust 
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to deviations from normality, separate Friedman’s tests were performed (i.e., one-way non-
parametric ANOVA equivalent) to supplement the findings. 
Figure 10 shows mean investment percentage of $5 (low) initial link investments 
subtracted from $35 (high) initial link investments (y-axis) at each terminal link investment 
amount (x-axis) in the now (open circles), one week (open squares), one month (open triangles), 
one year (open diamond), and five years (Xs) conditions, collapsed across income narrative 
groups. A two-way repeated measure ANOVA did not result in a significant effect of terminal 
investment amount (F (4, 624) = 2.26, p = .06), temporal gap (F (4, 624) = 2.27, p = .06), or the 
interaction of terminal investment amount and temporal gap (F (16, 2496) = 0.87, p = .61). A 
non-parametric Friedman’s test of differences among repeated measures of terminal link amount 
rendered a X2 of 17.5 (p = .002), however, the same test with temporal gap as the repeated 
measure rendered a X2 of 8.41, which was not significant (p = .08). 
Relatedly, Table 5 shows consolidated mean investment percentages of initial and 
terminal investment amounts (rows) across temporal gaps (columns). The majority of terminal 
investment percentages are greater when the initial investment amount is $5, however; several 
terminal investment amounts share a similar average across initial and terminal link investment 
amounts (e.g., $30 terminal investments across 30, 365, and 1825 days). Notably, for the $105 
terminal investment amount in the 0 day condition, the sample averages completing the terminal 
investment 5% more often when the initial investment is $35 compared to $5. 
Also collapsed across income narrative conditions, Figure 11 shows mean sunk cost 
instances (y-axis) across temporal gaps (x-axis) and terminal link amounts represented by white 
($5), light grey ($30), medium grey ($50), dark grey ($75), and black ($105) vertical bars. A 
two-way repeated measure ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of temporal gap (F (4, 
 
58 
624) = 32.62, p < .0001), terminal investment amount (F (4, 624) = 24.78, p <.0001), and a 
significant interaction between terminal link amount and temporal gap (F (16, 2496) = 5.45, p < 
.0001). Specifically, sunk cost instances tended to increase in frequency as a function of 
increasing terminal investment amount and tended to decrease in frequency as a function of 
increasing temporal gaps. The interaction between terminal investment amount and temporal 
gaps was such that greater effects of temporal gap were shown at higher terminal link values 
(i.e., only at $50, $75, and $105). A non-parametric Friedman’s test of differences among 
repeated measures of temporal gap rendered a X2 value of 114.6, which was statistically 
significant (p < .0001). The same test performed with terminal link amount as the repeated 
measure rendered a X2 of 198, which was also significant (p < .0001). 
Collapsed across income conditions, Figure 12 shows mean sunk cost proportion (y-axis) 
as a function of temporal gaps (x-axis) and terminal link amounts represented by white ($5), light 
grey ($30), medium grey ($50), dark grey ($75), and black ($105) vertical bars. A two-way 
repeated measure ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of temporal condition (F (4,624) 
= 22.60, p < .0001), terminal investment amount (F (4, 624) = 343.5, p < 0.0001), and a 
significant interaction of temporal condition and terminal investment amount (F (16, 2496) = 
6.16, p < .0001). Specifically, the main effect of temporal condition corresponded to greater sunk 
cost proportion as a function of increasing temporal gaps, and the main effect of terminal 
investment amount corresponded with greater sunk cost proportion as a function of increasing 
terminal link amount. A non-parametric Friedman’s test of sunk cost proportion differences 
among repeated measures of temporal gap rendered a X 2 value of 554.3, which was statistically 
significant (p < .0001). The same test performed with terminal link as the repeated measure 
rendered a X2 of 1716, which was also significant (p < .0001). 
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Correlation coefficients.Table 6 shows spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients, 
collapsed across income narrative groups, between the individual participant’s delay discounting 
(Ln (kdisc)), sunk cost instances, sunk cost proportion, mean terminal link investment percentage, 
future subjective time perception (Ln (kfut)), and past subjective time perception (Ln (kpast)), 
future temporal focus, current temporal focus, and past temporal focus. Delay discounting was 
positively correlated with future subjective time perception (rs = .25, p = .001) and past 
subjective time perception (rs = .21, p= 0.01) such that lower rates of discounting corresponded 
to perceptions that distant events were relatively more proximal to the present. Future and past 
subjective time perception were also positively correlated (rs = .74, p < .001). Frequency of sunk 
cost instances for each participant was positively correlated with sunk cost proportion (rs = 0.98, 
p < .001) and negatively correlated with mean investment percentage (rs = -.19, p = .02). Mean 
investment percentage was negatively correlated with sunk cost proportion (rs = -.24, p= .003). 
Delay discounting was not significantly related to sunk cost instances (rs = -.06, p= .45), sunk 
cost proportion (rs = -.07, p= .40), or mean investment percentage (rs = -.14, p= .07). There were 
no significant correlations between any measure of temporal focus and any measures of sunk 
cost or delay discounting (p > .32). 
 Due to the significant correlations between future (Ln (kfut)) and past (Ln (kpast)) 
subjective time perception and future and past temporal focus, the same correlations were 
evaluated within each income narrative group. Within the negative income narrative group, 
future and past time perception were significantly correlated (rs = .68, p < .0001) and future and 
past temporal focus were significantly correlated (rs = .44, p= 0.001). For the neutral income 
narrative group, future and past time perception were significantly correlated (rs = .81, p < 
.0001) and future and past temporal focus were significantly correlated (rs = .44, p= 0.0001). For 
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the positive income narrative group, future and past time perception were significantly correlated 
(rs = .71, p < .0001) and future and past temporal focus were significantly correlated (rs = .28, p 
= .03). 
Supplemental Analyses.  
Overall sunk cost.To provide a different level of analysis of the sunk cost effect, the 
natural log of the mean investment percentage for $35 initial investments was divided by mean 
investment percentage for $5 initial investments for each participant. In addition, this same 
calculation was performed at each temporal gap (i.e., now, 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 1 year, and 5 
years). Moving forward, this measure will be referred to as Ln (overall sunk cost).   
Joint time perception.Three additional temporal measures were created. First, due to the 
significant correlations between past and future time perception and both time perception 
measures and delay discounting (Ln (kdisc)), the areas under successive trapezoids formed by 
consecutive time perception data points were calculated using the summed trapezoid method for 
both the future and past time perception measures (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). 
Temporal distances were located on the y-axis and time points on the x-axis (days). Then, these 
two area under the curve (AUC) values (rs = .77, p < .0001) were added to form one measure of 
joint time perception (AUC). In other words, higher relative values of joint time perception 
(AUC) corresponded with a perception that distant events (future and past) were subjectively 
closer to the present.  
Time perception and temporal focus indices. Second, future time perception (Ln (kpast) 
was divided by past time perception to create a proportion measure comparing the two temporal 
directions (i.e., time perception index). An identical measure was created with temporal focus by 
dividing mean past temporal focus by mean future temporal focus (i.e., temporal focus index). 
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For both the temporal index measures, positive scores indicated that, with the present time as the 
referent, the participant perceived future events as subjectively closer to the present than past 
events of equivalent objective temporal distance. Negative scores indicated that the participant 
perceived past events as subjectively closer to the present than future events of the same 
objective temporal distance. The degree to which either score deviated from one can be 
conceptualized as the strength of the perceptual bias. 
Temporal attention and delay discounting. Correlation coefficients amongst delay 
discounting (Ln (kdisc)), Ln (overall sunk cost), future time perception (Ln (kfut)), past time 
perception (Ln (kpast), joint time perception, and time perception index can be seen in Table 7. 
Notably, delay discounting rate was negatively related to Ln (overall sunk cost; rs = -.18, p = 
.02), such that a greater propensity to exhibit the overall sunk cost corresponded with lower rates 
of delay discounting. Ln (overall sunk cost) failed to demonstrate significant correlations with 
delay discounting within the negative (rs = -.23, p = .10), neutral (rs = .01, p = .96), or positive 
groups (rs = -.22, p = .10). Similar to the correlations observed between delay discounting and 
both Ln (kfut) and Ln (kpast), delay discounting was positively correlated with both future (rs = -
.25, p = .001) and past (rs = -.21, p = .01) subjective time perception (AUCs), such that the closer 
participants perceived distant events relative to others, the lower their respective rates of 
discounting. The positive correlation (rs = .29, p = .001) between joint time perception and time 
perception index can be observed in Figure 13. The positive correlation between joint time 
perception and time perception index was such that the closer participants perceived the future 
relative to the past (i.e., high time perception index), the closer to the present participant’s 
perceived of future and past objective temporal distances. Finally, delay discounting (Ln (kdisc)) 
was positively correlated with joint time perception (rs = -.24, p = .003), but not the time 
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perception index (rs = -.10, p = .21). By contrast, Ln (overall sunk cost) was negatively related to 
time perception index (rs = -.20, p = .01), such that a greater propensity to exhibit the sunk cost 
corresponded with a perception that past events were closer to the present than future events of 
equivalent temporal distance. Ln (overall sunk cost) was not, however, significantly related to 
joint time perception (rs = -.03, p = .75).  
Table 8 shows spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients amongst sunk cost 
instances, sunk cost proportion, mean terminal investment percentage, joint time perception, and 
time perception index. Lower terminal investment percentages corresponded with a greater 
propensity to commit the sunk cost effect (rs= -.19, p = .02). None of the sunk cost related 
measures were related to joint time perception (p > .43). Time perception index was significantly 
related to sunk cost instances (rs = -.20, p = .01) and sunk cost proportion (rs = -.18, p = .02), 
however; time perception index was not significantly related to mean terminal investment 
percentage (rs = .06, p = .46). 
A non-parametric Quade ANCOVA was used to evaluate the effect of income narrative 
groups on Ln (overall sunk cost) with BMI and education as the covariates. The test was not 
significant (F (2, 154) = 2.18, p = .12). BMI was added due to the significant differences in BMI 
across income narrative groups reported earlier. The only significant difference in Ln (overall 
sunk cost) across demographic groups was education (p = .03). There were no significant 
correlations between Ln (overall sunk cost) and BMI or age (p > .32). Due to the correlation 
between time perception index (TP) and Ln (overall sunk cost), the previous non-parametric 
Quade ANCOVA was replicated with the additional covariate of time perception index. The 
effect remained non-significant (F (2, 154) = 2.37, p = .10). 
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A series of non-parametric Quade ANCOVAs with BMI as a covariate and income 
narrative as the grouping variable failed to demonstrate effects on joint time perception (F (2, 
154) = 0.98, p = .38), time perception index (F (2, 154) = 0.03, p = .97), and temporal focus 
index (F (2, 154) = 0.42, p = .66). 
Three final supplemental measures were created with the goal of adjusting the overall 
sunk cost measure by the number of trials each participant completed for both escalation-based 
trials and non-escalation-based trials. Specifically, sunk cost propensity was created by simply 
dividing overall sunk cost (without Ln) by the total number of trials experienced by the 
participant.  
𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
      (3) 
For sunk cost propensity (Esc) the overall sunk cost measure (i.e., mean terminal 
investment percentage for $35 initial links divided by those with $5 initial links) was replicated, 
except that only terminal link amounts above the trial mean were used (i.e., $75, $105), and the 
natural log was not used because the measure was already normally distributed (D =.07, p =. 
07)). Then, the resultant proportion was divided by the number of escalation trials experienced 
(i.e., $75 and $105 trials. The same process was used for sunk cost propensity (nonEsc), except 
that non-escalation trial amounts (i.e., $5, $30, and $50) were used instead of escalation amounts. 
Importantly, the sunk cost propensity measure was normally distributed and the remaining sunk 
cost propensity measures were non-normally distributed. 
 Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients are shown in Table 9 amongst delay 
discounting (Ln (kdisc)), sunk cost propensity, sunk cost propensity (NonEsc), sunk cost 
propensity (Esc), joint time perception, and time perception index. Notably, delay discounting 
was negatively correlated with sunk cost propensity (rs = -.22, p = .005) and sunk cost 
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propensity [(NonEsc) (rs = -.20, p = .01)], but not sunk cost propensity [(Esc) (rs = -.15, p = 
.07)]. In conjunction, this suggests that negative correlation between sunk cost propensity and 
delay discounting is more a function of the sunk cost effect occurring at lower terminal link 
amounts (i.e., $5, $30, and $50). Further, none of the sunk cost propensity measures were 
correlated with joint time perception or time perception index (p > .31). 
For each income narrative group, Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients were 
performed between delay discounting (Ln (kdisc)) and sunk cost propensity, sunk cost propensity 
(Esc), sunk cost propensity (NonEsc). For the negative income narrative group, delay 
discounting was significantly correlated with sunk cost propensity (rs = -.35, p = .01), sunk cost 
propensity (Esc) (rs = -.34, p = .02), and sunk cost propensity (NonEsc) (rs = -0.31, p = .03). For 
the neutral income narrative group, none of the measures were significant (rs > .08, p > .57). For 
the positive income narrative group, none of the measures were significant (rs > -.20, p > .13). 
Within the negative income narrative group, the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between delay 
discounting and sunk cost propensity were not significant in the low income group (r = -.04, p = 
.86), but were significantly related in the high income group (r = -.52, p = .01). 
Finally, three non-parametric Quade ANCOVAs were run with income narrative as the 
grouping variable, BMI as a covariate, and each measure’s respective mood score as an 
additional covariate. The dependent measures for the series of ANCOVAs were delay 
discounting, Ln (overall sunk cost), and joint time perception, respectively. There were no main 
effects observed for delay discounting (F (2, 150) = 0.21, p = .81), Ln (overall sunk cost) (F (2, 
152) = 0.53, p = .59), joint time perception (F (2, 152) = 0.08, p = .92), or past (F (2, 151) = 





There were three primary questions related to the current study. First, would valenced 
income narrative prompts concurrently alter sunk cost, delay discounting, and subjective time 
perception? In other words, would positive income narratives lower discounting and increase 
sunk cost, and negative narratives increase discounting and decrease sunk cost? These effects 
were anticipated due to findings reported by Sofis et al. (under revision), Sze et al. (2017), and 
Bickel et al. (2016b). The sunk cost effect and delay discounting were hypothesized to be a 
product of temporal attention. Subjective time perception was hypothesized to be the temporal 
process by which temporal attention altered choices in both the sunk cost and delay discounting 
tasks. The income narratives and their respective valences were hypothesized to affect future and 
past subjective time perception similarly, and thus, concurrently alter delay discounting and the 
sunk cost effect. The data from the current study failed to demonstrate any effect of the income 
narrative condition on subjective time perception, temporal focus, joint time perception, or time 
perception index. Aggregated within subject measures of sunk cost (e.g., AUC) and delay 
discounting (Ln (k)) failed to demonstrate significant differences across income narrative groups. 
Hyperboloid models of aggregated sunk cost data and indifference data across time points for 
each of the income narrative groups revealed that separate curves were better fit to the data than 
single curves for both sunk cost instances and delay discounting. Given that these findings were 
not replicated at the within-subject level, they should be interpreted with caution., if at all. 
The second question of the current study was whether the sunk cost would decrease as a 
function of temporal gaps in a manner similar to the data observed in the pilot study by Sofis and 
colleagues (under revision)? If the sunk cost effect is indeed a manifestation of temporal 
attention, then the general trend of decreasing sunk cost as a function of temporal gaps should be 
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observed. Within-subject trends of the sunk cost across temporal gaps did not show a clear 
decrease trend as a function of temporal gap, although a hyperboloid-shaped trend emerged when 
evaluating the aggregated data across temporal gaps for each of the income narrative groups. 
The third question of the current study was whether delay discounting would directly 
correlate with the sunk cost effect. Further, would a specific type of sunk cost be correlated with 
delay discounting? With the addition of an extra terminal link amount below the trial mean (i.e., 
$50), for example, the current study provided an opportunity to investigate potential differences 
between sunk costs at lower terminal amounts and those at higher terminal amounts. Delay 
discounting showed a negative correlation with sunk cost propensity, however, only sunk cost 
propensity (Nonesc; $5, $30, and $50) showed a significant relation. The direction of this 
relation was such that lower rates of delay discounting corresponded with a greater propensity to 
commit the sunk cost effect. Despite mirroring the direction reflected in the pilot study by Sofis 
et al. (under revision), attempts to replicate the finding for each group were only successful in the 
negative income narrative group. The size of the negative correlation between delay discounting 
and sunk cost propensity in the negative income narrative group was moderate, and both 
escalation and non-escalation based sunk cost propensities were significantly related to delay 
discounting. Given the selective nature of this relation, the finding should also be interpreted 
with caution. 
Based on these primary questions, the proposed experiment investigated effects of 
valenced income narratives (independent groups of positive, negative, or neutral narrative) on 
subjective time perception (future and past), temporal focus, delay discounting, and the sunk cost 
effect. Further discussion of the findings as they pertain to the primary questions and 
supplemental ones are discussed below. 
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Concurrent Effects of Income Narratives on Discounting, Sunk Cost, and Time Perception 
Generally, the income narratives used in the current experiment did not affect subjective time 
perception, temporal focus, delay discounting, or the sunk cost effect. The primary hypothesis 
was that the positive income narrative would make participants perceive distant events as seem 
closer to the present, which would correspond with lower rates of discounting and higher levels 
of the sunk cost. The exact opposite effects were expected to be observed for those in the 
negative income narrative group. A series of non-parametric Quade ANCOVAs showed that 
there were no significant effects of income narrative group on any of the decision-making or 
temporal measures used in the current study. This finding also held when accounting for 
covariates and mood scores taken prior to each respective measure. 
The income narrative manipulations did not affect any of the time perception or temporal 
focus measures used in the current study. The income narratives also did not consistently impact 
delay discounting or sunk cost. Although multiple researchers have argued that increased 
discounting rates following negative income shocks may be a product of a shift in temporal 
attention towards the present (Haushofer et al., 2013; Sze et al., 2017), the current data do not 
necessarily support this assertion. Such a shift in temporal attention is proposed to result in 
greater discounting of future events, thereby producing increased rates of discounting (Sze et al., 
2017). Some have argued that such a shift in temporal attention is a function of worsening mood 
(Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Kim & Zauberman, 2013), however, robust differences in mood were 
observed across the income narrative groups prior to subjective time perception, temporal focus 
measures, delay discounting, and the sunk cost. Further, when accounting for mood in a series of 
ANCOVA models, there was not a significant effect of income narrative group on joint time 
perception, all temporal focus measures, delay discounting, and all sunk cost measures. 
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Therefore, it appears that there was a strong effect of income narratives on mood, but that effect 
did not necessarily translate to time perception, temporal focus, or the other primary measures of 
interest.  
Temporal focus and subjective time perception measures appeared to demonstrate 
symmetrical patterns across future and past measures. Indeed, past and future temporal focus 
measures were positive correlated and demonstrated a medium correlation (rs = .41, p < .0001). 
Past (Ln (kpast)) and future (Ln (kfut)) time perception were also positively correlated, but showed 
a stronger correlation (rs = .74, p < .0001). The shapes of future and past time perception curves 
shown in Figure 8 were also well fit by hyperbolic models. Individual Ln (k) values were 
calculated for future and past time perception curves, suggesting that the particularly strong 
correlation further supports a symmetry pattern between future and past time perception. Further, 
the symmetrical correlations were replicated across each income narrative group, despite the 
reduced power available for those tests. Together, these findings support the notion that future 
and past time perception and future and past temporal focus are both likely to be symmetrical in 
nature. Such a findings falls in line well with previous interpretations of temporal attention as a 
symmetrical effect of perceived temporal distance from the present for both future and past 
events (Kim & Zauberman, 2013; Radu et al., 2011; Yi et al., 2006).  
It also appears equally unlikely that the income narratives failed to alter time perception 
because of a lack of correlations between time perception measures, delay discounting, and the 
sunk cost. Specifically, the time perception index correlated with the sunk cost, and joint time 
perception with delay discounting. As would be expected, a greater relative focus on the past (i.e. 
lower time perception index) was related to greater levels of the sunk cost, and greater joint time 
perception (i.e. viewing distant past and future events as subjective closer to the present) was the 
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related to lower rates of delay discounting. Adding joint time perception and time perception 
index to the ANCOVA models of delay discounting and sunk cost, however, did not result in a 
significant effect of income narrative group.  
Participants tended to perceive past events as subjectively closer to the present than 
future events, but reported focusing on future events more than past events. As previously 
reported, however, temporal focus was positively correlated with time perception index, 
suggesting some overlap between the two measures. In addition, younger individuals showed 
worse joint time perception and lower past and future temporal focus scores than older adults. In 
other words, younger individuals perceived distant events as subjectively further from the 
present and reported focusing less on future and past events than their older counterparts. 
College-age students (i.e., 18-23) also tend to view the past as progressing more slowly 
compared to older adults (Friedman & Janssen, 2010; Wittmann & Lehnhoff, 2005). The current 
data from the temporal measures therefore seem to fall in line with previous reports suggesting 
that older adults view the past as progressing increasingly quickly (Friedman & Janssen, 2010; 
Wittmann & Lehnhoff, 2005). Additional research is needed to confirm the contrasting biases of 
subjective time perception and temporal focus observed in the present study, however; the 
combination of the contrasting biases and similar age-related trends observed here support the 
assertion that subjective time perception and temporal focus are likely unique but related 
constructs. 
Data from the current study do not pinpoint why the income narratives did not alter any 
measure of subjective time perception or temporal focus. Future research might explore two 
possibilities. First, the mechanism by which income narratives affect discounting may be more 
complicated than simply a shift in temporal attention. In other words, temporal attention may 
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only shift as a result of more robust physiological factors such as arousal (Kim & Zauberman, 
2013), that may not have been sufficiently affected by the income narratives used in the present 
experiment. Significant differences in mood across income narrative groups did not translate to 
effects on delay discounting, the sunk cost, or any temporal measures, suggesting that mood may 
only be indirectly related to temporal attention, delay discounting, and the sunk cost effect. 
Future research might replicate the current experiment, but add a within-subject component 
wherein participants experience a neutral narrative and a positive or negative narrative 
(counterbalanced across participants). In addition, inducing fear or sexual arousal (see Kim & 
Zauberman, 2013) may induce greater physiological changes that alter temporal attention. 
Second, the components of which temporal attention is a function may be more complicated than 
previously asserted. Perhaps the “attending” and the “temporal” parts of temporal attention, for 
example, are related but independent constructs that must both be affected to successfully 
account for shifts in temporal attention. To this end, researchers might benefit from adding 
subjective time perception (future and past) and temporal sunk cost paradigms to studies using a 
delay discounting task. Further, specific components of independent variables manipulations 
such as time-estimation priming (Radu et al., 2011) and episodic future thinking (Daniel, 
Sawyer, Dong, Bickel, & Epstein, 2016) could be used to better isolate the particular conditions 
under which delay discounting, subjective time perception, and the sunk cost are affected. One 
approach would be to isolate the effects of episodic and temporal aspects of episodic thinking on 
subjective time perception, delay discounting, and the sunk cost effect. Does future episodic 
thinking (bias for temporally distant events), for example, result in lower rates of discounting and 
better subjective time perception than a “future thinking” control condition that only emphasizes 
temporal aspects? Similarly, would recent episodic thinking (present bias; low temporal 
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attention) result in higher rates of discounting compared to a recent thinking condition that only 
prompts temporal characteristics? With the addition of future and past subjective time perception 
measures used in the present study, such investigations could provide valuable information on 
whether the temporal and attentional components of temporal attention can be isolated, and in 
turn how they might contribute to the sunk cost effect and delay discounting. 
The Sunk Cost Effect  
There was a decreasing propensity to exhibit any sunk cost measure as a function of the 
size of the temporal gap, which appears to mirror the general trend observed from the pilot study 
performed by Sofis and colleagues (under revision). There was significant support for separate 
hyperboloid curves for mean sunk cost instances across temporal gaps. This observed effect is 
consistent with the initial hypothesis that those in the positive income group would show lower 
rates of discounting and a greater propensity to exhibit the sunk cost effect. Importantly, 
however, the support for separate hyperboloid curves of mean sunk cost instances for the 
narrative groups should be interpreted cautiously. The sum-of-squares F test merely assesses 
differences between the fits of the hyperboloid curves by isolating the k parameter in the model 
(Rachlin, 2006). Although the curve of the mean sunk cost data for those in the positive group 
showed a unique k value compared to those in the negative group, the significant effect derived 
from the sum-of-squares F test may have been an artifact of minor differences in the quality of 
the model fits, not due to actual differences in sunk cost. Second, all non-parametric ANCOVA 
models with sunk cost related variables as the dependent measure were non-significant. It is not 
possible to isolate why the income narratives did not more robustly alter the sunk cost effect 
because of the null effect of income narrative group on subjective time perception and temporal 
focus. One barrier that also may have contributed to the null-effect was the incongruence 
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between the shapes of sunk cost functions across temporal gaps for individual subject data. 
Specifically, although the shape of the aggregate sunk cost and delay discounting functions were 
hyperboloid; individual participants only demonstrated this function with the discounting data. 
Although 81% of subjects committed at least one instance of the sunk cost effect many 
participants did not specifically show a hyperboloid-like shape of declining sunk cost instances 
as a function of temporal gap. Specifically, many participants demonstrated flat or inconsistent 
sunk cost effects across temporal gaps. Similar to the results reported in the pilot study by Sofis 
and colleagues (under revision), individual participant patterns of sunk cost instances generally 
showed a declining, if not hyperbolic or hyperboloid, decline. These findings further suggest the 
significant differences observed in the aggregated data across income narrative groups should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Interestingly, when collapsing across the sample, there was an interaction effect between 
terminal amount and temporal gap of sunk cost instances. In other words, the only significant 
post hoc tests were found to be at higher terminal amounts (i.e., $50, $75, and $105) and when 
comparing temporal gaps of greater distances (e.g., 0 vs. 365 days). In addition to the main 
effects of both terminal sunk cost amount and temporal gap, this finding suggests that both 
terminal investment amounts and temporal gaps likely contribute to the occurrence of the cost 
effect. The overall sunk cost and sunk cost propensity measures more explicitly compare 
terminal investment behavior when the initial link is $35, compared to when it is $5. The 
selective correlations between these measures and delay discounting, in conjunction with the 
main effects of temporal gap and terminal sunk cost amount, suggest that the sunk cost likely 
entails at least three relevant components. Specifically, the initial link, terminal link, and 
temporal gap are all aspects of the sunk cost that must be either controlled or manipulated in 
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experimental settings. The fact that delay discounting only correlated with the sunk cost 
measures that weight initial link responding more heavily suggests that future research might 
benefit from targeting the experimental parameters of the initial link to better understand how 
discounting and the sunk cost relate. 
Sunk Cost and Temporal Measures  
Time perception index was negatively correlated with Ln (overall sunk cost) such that a 
greater emphasis on the past relative to the future corresponded with a greater propensity to 
commit the sunk cost. Time perception index was also negatively correlated with both sunk cost 
instances and sunk cost proportion, which further supports an underlying relation. Unlike delay 
discounting, none of the sunk cost measures or investment measures showed any relation to joint 
time perception. These findings suggest the possibility that the sunk cost and delay discounting 
may be undergirded by unique but related temporal constructs. Similarly, retrospection and 
prospection may be a product of unique but related processes (Daniel et al., 2016). Daniel et al. 
(2016), for example, investigated future and past delay discounting (within subject) across 
prospective thinking, retrospective thinking, and control groups (between subject). The authors 
found that the prospective group showed the lowest rates of discounting of future events and the 
retrospective group showed the lowest rates of discounting of past events compared to controls. 
Notably, those in the prospective thinking group showed lower rates of past discounting 
compared to controls and those in the retrospective thinking group showed lower rates of future 
discounting compared to controls. The authors argued that although past experiences may be 
used to simulate or prospect towards future events, the effects of retrospection and prospection 
might not act interchangeably to affect rates of delay discounting. Further, perhaps unique 
temporal constructs (e.g., joint time perception/time perception index, subjective time 
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perception/temporal focus) may function in a similar fashion. Future research might benefit from 
replicating the Daniel et al. (2016) study with the temporal measures used in the present study to 
determine whether unique temporal constructs underlie particular discounting and sunk cost 
effects mediated by prospective and retrospective thinking. Ideally, future research would also 
compare the effects of a temporal and non-temporal manipulation on temporal measures, sunk 
cost, and delay discounting to better isolate the potential role of such temporal measures 
underlying delay discounting and the sunk cost. 
Sunk cost and delay discounting.When collapsing across the sample, delay discounting 
was negatively related to Ln (overall sunk cost), sunk cost propensity, and sunk cost propensity 
(NonEsc). No such relations were observed between delay discounting and sunk cost instances, 
sunk cost proportion, or mean terminal investment percentage. Much of the weight behind the 
correlations between delay discounting and sunk cost propensities, however, was likely carried 
by the strength of the correlation observed in the negative income narrative group. Further, those 
in the high-income group who experienced the negative income narrative demonstrated a robust 
correlation between sunk cost propensity and delay discounting, while those with lower incomes 
did demonstrate the effect. These findings suggest that only those with higher personal incomes 
showed the relation of more sunk cost corresponding with lower rates of delay discounting. 
These selective effects should be taken with caution, however, because there was low statistical 
power available after splitting the groups on income narrative group and personal income. 
Roughly double the number of participants used in the current experiment may be needed to 
have sufficient power to evaluate combined effects of income narratives and personal income 
groups. The current study did not find main effects of income narrative group on delay 
discounting or sunk cost measures. The selective correlations of high-income individuals in the 
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negative income narrative group, however, suggest that it may be prudent to replicate the current 
experimental arrangement with larger sample sizes to evaluate a potential interaction effect 
between personal income and income narratives.  
Ln (overall sunk cost) and sunk cost propensity were both a product of dividing the 
averaging terminal investment percentages for $35 initial investments by that of terminal 
investment percentages of $5 initial investments. Interestingly, only sunk cost propensity 
(nonEsc), (not sunk cost propensity (Esc)), was significantly correlated with delay discounting. 
In other words, a higher overall propensity to commit the sunk cost with lower terminal 
investment amounts corresponded with lower rates of delay discounting. The correlations 
between delay discounting and the sunk cost propensity measures, however, were only 
significant in the negative income narrative group. Further, all of the sunk cost propensity 
measures showed a moderate effect size correlation (rs > -.31, p < .03). The significant direct 
correlation between delay discounting and sunk cost propensity in the negative income group is a 
particularly interesting finding when considering that the two phenomena did not share any 
overlapping correlations with temporal focus or subjective time perception measures. 
Specifically, delay discounting directly correlated with future and past subjective time perception 
and joint time perception, and the sunk cost correlated with time perception index, a relative 
measure that divides past by future time perception. Taken together, these data suggest that 
temporal attention may be one of multiple underlying factors shared by the sunk cost and delay 
discounting. 
Summary, limitations, and future directions. In conclusion, the current experiment 
suggests that temporal focus and subjective time perception measures did not directly relate, 
however; temporal focus and subjective time perception measures showed symmetrical effects 
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such that greater future temporal focus related to greater past focus and perceiving distant future 
events as subjectively closer to the present related to perceiving distant past events as closer to 
the present. Regardless of income narrative group, participants tended to perceive the past as 
closer to the present than the future and the self-reported focusing on the future more than the 
past. The income narrative manipulation in the current experiment resulted in inconsistent effects 
with delay discounting and the sunk cost, and no effects with past or future subjective time 
perception, and any dimension of temporal focus. Notably, those participants in the positive 
narrative group demonstrated lower rates of discounting and higher levels of sunk cost than those 
in the negative narrative group when using aggregate measures of sunk cost and delay 
discounting. Ln (overall sunk cost) and delay discounting demonstrated a modest negative 
correlation, however; none of the temporal measures used were found to underlie Ln (overall 
sunk cost) and delay discounting. The measures of time perception index and joint time 
perception only related to the sunk cost and delay discounting, respectively. A disproportionate 
amount of variance for delay discounting is uniquely accounted for by joint time perception 
above and beyond that of the income narrative manipulation. There are three further points of 
note. 
First, the current experiment failed to demonstrate that the current income narrative 
manipulation affected temporal attention, delay discounting, and the sunk cost effect. These 
findings stand somewhat at odds with the argument that income narratives affect discounting by 
constricting the temporal window (Bickel et al., 2016b). These findings also contrast with 
arguments that negative income shocks lead to short-sighted attentional focus due to negative 
affect (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). Indeed, robust differences in mood corresponding to the 
valence of the income narratives groups were observed for temporal focus, time perception, 
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delay discounting, and the sunk cost. Further, mood prior to the delay discounting task was 
negatively correlated with delay discounting rate in the current study, which appears to replicate 
findings linking negative affect to higher rates of discounting (see Haushofer & Fehr, 2014 for a 
review). In conjunction, these findings suggests that in certain contexts, negative affect may 
increase delay discounting without affecting subjective time perception. This finding falls in line 
with those reported by Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2012), who found that scarcity conditions 
increased attentional engagement for low-income (experimentally-speaking) participants. 
Importantly, however, existing evidence only has demonstrated a general effect of scarcity on 
attentional engagement (Kim & Zauberman, 2013; Shah et al., 2012) not necessarily an effect on 
temporal attention. Future research might benefit by first targeting the process (es) that might 
underlie temporal attention. Comparing the effects of scarcity conditions both with and without 
temporal factors, for example, may be useful in better understanding the interplay of measures 
such as subjective time perception, joint time perception, and time perception index. 
Second, temporal attention may be considerably more complicated than previously 
thought, such that multiple temporal processes may undergird temporal attention. Data from the 
current experiment, for example, suggest that joint time perception is a separate but related 
construct to time perception index. Further, the degree to which individual participants focused 
on the past relative to the future was positively related to the degree to which they perceived the 
past as closer to the present than the future. Within the context of subjective time perception, 
joint time perception and time perception index were uniquely related to delay discounting and 
Ln (overall sunk cost), respectively. In conjunction, these findings suggest that both joint time 
perception and time perception index may represent unique temporal constructs. A similar stance 
was taken by Bickel et al. (2016b), who differentiated the narrowing of attention and constriction 
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of the temporal window. Unlike the Bickel et al. (2016b) report, however, the current data do not 
show that income narratives constricted the temporal window. 
To better pinpoint whether temporal attention underlies valuation measured in 
discounting and sunk cost paradigms, the effects of temporal and non-temporal manipulations on 
temporal measures such as joint time perception and time perception index could be evaluated as 
potential mediators or moderators of delay discounting and the sunk cost effect. Future research 
might use some of the manipulations discussed in Bickel, Stein, et al. (2017a) to differentially 
target future and past-specific effects. Alternatively, it may be important to first understand how 
measures such as subjective time perception, joint time perception, and time perception index 
respond to common temporal manipulations separate from measurement of delay discounting. 
Manipulations such as the date/delay effect (Read et al., 2005), hidden zero affect (Magen et al., 
2008b; Naude, Kaplan, Reed, Henley, & DiGennaro-Reed, 2018), and temporal priming (Radu et 
al., 2011; Zauberman et al., 2009), for example, may help uncover how joint time perception and 
time perception index covary and potentially interact to affect the sunk cost affect and delay 
discounting. 
Third, there were several limitations of the current study. First, hypothetical rewards were 
used in the current study; however, there is a close correspondence between hypothetical and real 
rewards (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2013; Johnson & Bickel, 
2002; Madden et al., 2003; Madden et al., 2004), even at the neural level (Bickel et al., 2009a). 
Further, although there is not yet evidence showing correspondence between real and 
hypothetical rewards within a sunk cost task, the current experiment explicitly told participants 
that their performance on the sunk cost task was linked to a bonus that, when earned, effectively 
doubled their experimental earnings.  
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Second, hypothetical temporal gaps were used in the current study; however, participants 
had to select the correct temporal gap in which they would make sunk cost decisions prior to 
starting each round of the sunk cost task. Further, sunk cost instances, sunk cost proportion, and 
terminal investments systematically declined as a function of temporal gap in a similar fashion to 
circumstances wherein initial costs and temporal gaps were actually experienced by participants 
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Gorville & Soman, 1998).  
Third, the independent variable used in the current study (valenced income narratives) 
was hypothetical in nature. Despite this, delay discounting has been shown to be sensitive to 
hypothetical income narrative manipulations (Bickel et al., 2016b; Sze et al., 2017). Further, the 
income narratives demonstrated a clear effect on affect (i.e., mood scores prior to each task) 
performed in the current study, which has been suggested as a primary route by which income 
narratives may function (see Haushofer & Fehr, 2014 for a review).  
Fourth, although there was sufficient power to evaluate differences in the primary 
dependent measures across the income narrative groups, there was not sufficient power to 
evaluate both income narrative groups and income (low/high). Such an analysis would be 
prudent for future research because of previous findings linking poverty to higher rates of delay 
discounting (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Haushofer et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2012; Tanaka, 
Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010). Lastly, due to insufficient power, the current experiment did not add 
a temporal manipulation already known to affect delay discounting (e.g., episodic future 
thinking; Sze et al. (2017)) to compare the effects of the temporal and non-temporal 
manipulations on the primary dependent measures. Such an addition may have been fruitful, but 




Finally, all participants experienced the subjective time perception procedure 
immediately after the income narrative generation and prior to the delay discounting and sunk 
cost measures. Because the subjective time perception procedure is similar to a time-estimation 
task used by Radu et al. (2011) to reduce rates of delay discounting, the administration of the 
subjective time perception task prior to delay discounting and sunk cost tasks may have 
influenced the lack of observed effects on the dependent measures. Based on arguments made by 
Bickel et al. (2016b) and Haushofer et al. (2013), however, any experimental effects from the 
subjective time perception task were hypothesized to interact with the income narratives by 
affecting the temporal window in which delay discounting and sunk cost choices were made. 
Further, there is no evidence to my knowledge suggesting that valenced income narratives and 
temporal priming affects would result in competing effects. Therefore, prior to the current study, 
any potential effect of completing the subjective time perception task was hypothesized to only 
strengthen the effect of income narratives on the primary dependent measures. Nevertheless, the 
lack of significant effects of income narratives on any of the primary dependent measures could 
have been due to interference from the subjective time perception task. Alternatively, the lack of 
effects could have been a result of changes to the income narrative conditions from those 
reported in Bickel et al. (2016b). Specifically, the lack of effects observed in the current study 
could have been due to omitting income narrative features pertaining to job loss and moving due 
to changes at one’s job, and equating the amount of pay change between negative and positive 
income narrative groups. Ideally, future research would evaluate the effects of temporal and non-
temporal manipulations previously shown to independently affect rates of delay discounting and 
investigate how those manipulations alter subjective time perception measures, delay 
discounting, and the sunk cost effect. 
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Fourth, due to unique correlations observed between joint time perception and time 
perception index with delay discounting and Ln (overall sunk) respectively, the negative 
correlation observed between Ln (overall sunk cost) and delay discounting may have been a 
product of non-temporal factors. Such a statement is difficult to confirm from the current data, 
however, because there was not an effect of income narrative group on any of the temporal 
measures (e.g., subjective time perception). A clearer understanding of the relation between the 
sunk cost and delay discounting may occur if both temporal and non-temporal manipulations are 
implemented in conjunction with the temporal measures used in the current study. Although 
research on potential overlap between delay discounting and the sunk cost effect is nascent, there 
is considerable potential for conceptual and translational value. Specifically, both delay 
discounting and the sunk cost effect are phenomena wherein reward processes (mPFC) and time-
based processes (dlPFC) undergird a tradeoff context representative of competing neural systems 
(Haller & Schwabe, 2014; McClure & Bickel, 2014; McClure et al., 2004). Differentially 
stimulating the left dlPFC using techniques such as repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(rTMS) in a clinical context, for example, has been shown to decrease delay discounting and 
increase abstinence (nicotine) compared to a sham condition (Sheffer et al., 2018). Such an 
approach may also help determine the overlap between the sunk cost and delay discounting. 
Further, as proposed by Rachlin (2000), engaging in the sunk cost may be an important 
component underlying persistence directed towards larger later reinforcers. In the pilot study by 
Sofis and colleagues (under revision), those in the higher subjective time perception group 
showed greater levels of sunk cost and decreased discounting rates compared to those in the low 
subjective time perception group. In other words, perceiving distant events as subjectively closer 
to the present corresponded with a greater the propensity to commit the sunk cost and lower rates 
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of discounting. The direction of the relation between sunk cost and delay discounting as a 
function of high and low subjective time perception groups observed in the pilot study, in 
conjunction with the direct correlation observed between Ln (overall sunk cost) and delay 
discounting in the current study, suggests that further investigation into the overlap between 
these two phenomena is warranted. Although the findings from the two studies cannot pinpoint 
exactly how delay discounting and sunk cost relate, these data suggest that delay discounting and 
the sunk cost effect could share both temporal and non-temporal processes. In such a case, a 
better understanding of the shared processes underlying these phenomena may prove fruitful in 
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Key Temporal Constructs Related to Temporal Attention. 
  Definition  Time-Scale  Example 
Time 
Perspective 
 Assumed link between 
positive/negative attitudes 
and relative consideration 
of past, present, and future 




“I take each day as it is rather than 
try to plan it out.” (Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999) 





Subjective perception of 
durations between now and 
another point in time 
compared to objective time 




 Participants are asked to imagine a 
day x time from now, and indicate 
how long the given duration is on a 
181 mm line with “very short” on 
the left end and “very long” on the 
right end (Zauberman et al., 2009) 






Accuracy in measuring 
objective clock time  
(Wittmann, Rudolph, 





 A participant might be asked to 
verbally report when x minutes have 
passed or report after the fact how 
clock time much time has passed 
(Wittmann, Leland, & Paulus, 2007; 




Table 2. Continuous Demographic Measures 




 Continuous Demographic Measures   
Variable  Overall  Negative  Neutral  Positive 
 
p value 
  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD    
Age  39.9 12.0  40.2 11.6  40.3 12.1  39.3 12.5 
 
0.83  
BMI  27.8 6.6  26.4 6.9  28.1 5.5  28.9 7.0  0.04  
Completion Time 
(min) 





Table 3. Non-continuous Demographic Measures.  
Note: p values derived from the results of chi-squared tests are shown in the far-right column 
  
Non-Continuous Demographic Measures 
      Income Narrative Groups 
  
Overall  Negative Neutral  Positive 
 p 
value 
  n %  n %  n %  n %   
Gender              0.99 
 Male 72 46  23 46  23 46  26 46   
 Female 85 54  27 54  27 54  31 54   
Ethnicity              0.25 
 Caucasian/White 128 83  37 76  44 88  47 84   




2 1  1 2  1 2  0 0 
 
 




1 1  0 0  1 2  0 0 
 
 
 Other 7 5  2 4  1 2  4 7   
Education              0.45 
 Less than High School 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0   
 High School/GED 12 8  3 6  2 4  7 12   
 Some College 44 28  12 24  19 38  13 23   
 2-year College 22 14  6 12  8 16  8 14   
 4-year College 58 37  23 46  13 26  22 39   
 Professional Degree 20 13  6 12  7 14  7 12   
 Doctorate 1 1  0 0  1 2  0 0   
Income             
 
0.34 
 Less than $10,000 20 13  7 14  5 10  8 14   
 $10,000-$19,999 15 10  3 6  8 16  4 7   
 $20,000-$29,999 19 12  5 10  8 16  6 11   
 $30,000-$39,999 24 15  7 14  8 16  9 16   
 $40,000-$49,999 18 12  6 12  2 4  10 18   
 $50,000-$59,999 17 11  3 6  4 8  10 18   
 $60,000-$69,999 17 11  9 18  5 10  3 5   
 $70,000-$79,999 12 8  6 12  2 4  4 7   
 $80,000-$89,999 4 3  2 4  1 2  1 2   
 $90,000-$99,000 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0   
 $100,000-$149,999 11 7  2 4  7 14  2 4   
 More than $150,000 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0   
Employm
ent 
            
 
0.63 
 Full-time 94 61  30 61  33 66  31 55   
 Part-time 22 14  8 16  4 8  10 18   
 Unempl. looking 6 4  3 6  0 0  3 5   
 Unempl. not looking 18 12  4 8  7 14  7 13   
 Retired 10 7  2 4  5 10  3 5   
 Student 2 1  1 2  0 0  1 2   




Table 4. Correlation Coefficients of Temporal Focus and Time Perception.  
Correlation Coefficients of Temporal Focus and Time Perception  
   2  3  4 
 5 









1. Past TF  0.01 .94  .41 <.001  .05 .58  .20 .013 
2. Current TF     -.05 .56  .04 .61  .02 .77 
3. Future TF        -.06 .48  .01 .90 
4. TP (Ln (kpast)           .74 <.001 
5. TP (Ln (kfut)             










Table 5. Mean Investment Percentage for Initial-Terminal Combinations and Temporal Gaps 
 
Mean Investment Percentage for Initial-Terminal Combinations and Temporal Gaps 
Link  Number of Days Ago 
Initial  Terminal  0 




         
  5  0.99 
 0.99  0.98  0.98  0.98 
  30  0.92 
 0.94  0.95  0.92  0.94 
5  50  0.76 
 0.81  0.83  0.82  0.84 
  75  0.57 
 0.56  0.59  0.61  0.68 
  105  0.33 
 0.21  0.22  0.25  0.40 
  5  0.98 
 0.97  0.97  0.96  0.97 
  30  0.91 
 0.92  0.94  0.92  0.95 
35  50  0.79 
 0.77  0.79  0.81  0.84 
  75  0.54 
 0.49  0.50  0.53  0.61 
  105  0.38 








Table 6. Correlation Coefficients of Primary Dependent Measures. 
 
       Note: Significant correlations (i.e., p < .05) bolded 
 
  
  Correlation Coefficients of Primary Dependent Measures    
   2  3  4  5     6  7  8  9 
   
 
r  r  r  r  r  r  r  r 
1. DD Ln (k)  -.06  -.07  -.14  .25  .21  .06  .07  .05 
2. SC Inst    .98  -.19  .08  -.06  .07  -.05  .03 
3. SC Prop      -.26  .07  -.06  .06  -.06  .02 
4. Invest %        -.10  -.03 .03 .03  .04 




          .05 .04  -.06 
                 
7. PTF             .01  .41 
                 
8. CTF               -.05 
                 
9. FTF                




Table 7. Correlation Coefficients and Significance Values for Primary Dependent Measures and 
Supplemental Measures 
Correlation Coefficients for Primary Dependent Measures and Supplemental Measures 
   2  3  4  5  6 





1. Ln (kdisc) 
 
-.18 .02  .25 .001  .21 .01  -.24 .003  -.10 .21 
2. Ln (Overall SC)    .04 .62  -.06 .46  .03 .75  -.20 .01 
3. TP (Ln (kfut)       .74 <.001  -.92 <.001  -.56 <.001 
4. TP (Ln (kpast)          -.90 <.001  .03 .74 





              






Table 8. Sunk Cost and Supplemental Time Perception Correlation Coefficients. 





3  4 
 
 5 
1. Sunk Cost Instances    0.98 
 
-0.19  0.00 
 
 -0.20 
2. Sunk Cost Proportion   
 
-0.26  0.01 
 
 -0.19 
3. Mean Investment %   
 
  0.06 
 
 0.06 
4. Joint TP   
 
   
 
 0.29 
5. Time Perception Index   
 
   
 
  











Table 9. Correlation Coefficients of Supplemental Measures (B) 
 














Correlation Coefficients of Supplemental Measures (B) 
   2  3  4  5     6 
   
 
r  r  r  r  r 
1. Ln (kdisc)  -.22  -.20  -.15  -.24  -.10 
2. SC Propensity    .89  .73  .07  -.08 
3. SC Propensity (NonEsc)      .46  .08  -.03 
4. SC Propensity (Esc)        .08  -.08 
5. Joint Time Perception          .29 






Figure 1. Potential Reversals from Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting Models.  Scenarios 














Figure 2. Conceptual Representation of Time Perception.  Subjective time perception (top half of 
panel) measures test for one’s perceived duration between the present and a temporally distant 
event (e.g., weeks months or years). Time estimation procedure (bottom half of panel) usually 
probe for one’s best guess of the objective amount of time that has passed during relatively short 





Figure 3. Sunk Cost Instance Two-Trial Example.  The left panel shows a trial wherein the 
participant passes on an $80 terminal link following the completion of a forced-choice $5 initial 
link. The right panel shows a trial wherein the participant completes an $80 terminal link 
following the completion of a forced choice $35 initial link. In conjunction, these two events 







Figure 4. Pilot Temporal Attention, Sunk Cost, and Delay Discounting. The left panel shows Ln 
(mean sunk cost proportion) (y-axis) across temporal gaps (x-axis) and the right panel shows 
mean indifference points (y-axis)  across delays (x-axis) for those in the high (open circles and 
dashed lines) and low (open squares and solid lines) subjective time perception conditions. Error 























































Figure 5. Mood Scores Taken Prior to Temporal Focus, Time Perception, Delay Discounting, 
and Sunk Cost Tasks. Mean mood scores (y-axis) are shown as a function of income narrative 
group (x-axis) for the measures of temporal focus (white bars), time perception (light grey bars), 
delay discounting (medium grey bars), and sunk cost (dark grey bars). Error bars represent 







Figure 6. Mean Sunk Cost and Indifference Points Across Time Conditions and Income 
Narrative Groups.  The left panel shows mean sunk cost instances (y-axis) across temporal gaps 
(x-axis) and the right panel shows median indifference points (y-axis)  across delays (x-axis) for 
those in the negative (open circles with heavy dashed lines), neutral (open squares with solid 
lines), and positive (open triangles with lightly dashed lines). Error bars represent standard error 
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Figure 7. Mean Sunk Cost Instances Across Temporal Gaps and Income Narrative Groups. Mean 
sunk cost instances (y-axis) across temporal gap (x-axis) for those in the negative (open circles 
with heavy dashed lines), neutral (open squares with solid lines), and positive (open triangles 
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Figure 8. Mean and Median Temporal Distances Across Income Narrative Groups for Future and 
Past Time Perception. Mean temporal distance is reverse scored (top panels; y-axes) as is median 
temporal distance (bottom panels; y-axes) across days from the now (x-axis) for those in the 
negative (open circles with heavy dashed lines), neutral (open squares with solid lines), and 
positive (open triangles with lightly dashed lines). Error bars for mean temporal distance graphs 
(top panels) represent standard error of the mean. Error bars for median temporal distance graphs 
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Figure 9. Correlation Between Past (Ln (kpast)) and Future (Ln (kfut)) Subjective Time Perception. 
A linear regression line is plotted with the spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient denoted 
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Figure 10. $35-$5 Mean Initial Investments Across Terminal Link Amounts.  Means of $5 initial 
investments subtracted from the mean of $35 initial investments for each participant are 
aggregated (y-axis) across terminal link amount (x-axis). Temporal gaps are represented by open 
circles (0 days), open squares (7 days), open triangles (30 days), open diamonds (365 days), and 































Figure 11. Mean SC Instances Across Temporal Gaps and Terminal Amounts. Mean sunk cost 
instances (y-axis) are shown as a function of temporal gaps (x-axis). Colored bars of light grey 
($5), medium light grey ($30), medium grey ($50), dark grey ($75), and heavy dark grey ($105) 










































Figure 12. Sunk Cost Proportion as a Function of Temporal Gap and Terminal Amount. Sunk 
cost proportion (y-axis) is shown as a function of temporal gaps (x-axis). Colored bars of light 
grey ($5), medium light grey ($30), medium grey ($50), dark grey ($75), and heavy dark grey 
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Figure 13. Joint Time Perception and Time Perception Index Scatterplot.  Scatter plot with joint 
time perception (y-axis) and time perception index (x-axis). A linear regression line is plotted 
with the spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient denoted in the bottom right corner (rs = 






                                                             Appendix A 
A. Power Analysis I 
 
Haushofer & Fehr (2013) 
Positive Income Shock-Always Rich (Tom vs. 6 months): .096 
Positive Income Shock-Always Rich (Tom vs. 12 months): .034 
Positive Income Shock-Always Rich (6 months vs. 12 months): .19 
Mean = .1067 
Negative Income Shock-Always Poor (Tom vs. 6 months): .249 
Negative Income Shock-Always Poor (Tom vs. 12 months): .122 















C. Power Analysis III 
 
Haushofer & Fehr (2013) and Sze et al., 2017 
.1067/.1513 = .7052 







































































M. Delay Discounting Choice Context 
 
 
